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Abstract- The intention of this thesis is twofold; it revolves around the assimilation of relativity 
as a case study, and in the process aims to reveal valuable insight about the assimilation of 
anomalous scientific knowledge as well as about the specific case study of relativity. Chapter 1 
examines the scientific and societal context that preceded the acquisition of relativity. After a 
brief introduction and overview of Newtonian mechanics, it considers the rise of probabilism and 
the ways in which it revealed underlying nuance in the preexisting Newtonian worldview. Next, 
it examines the process of reconciling probabilism and classical physics; this illuminates that the 
Newtonian model of space and time is at the heart of the difficulty. The remainder of the chapter 
considers the historical context and philosophical implications of Newton’s absolute space. 
Chapter 2 is an explicit discussion about the assimilation of anomalous scientific information. It 
analyzes the possible responses to anomalous data, differentiating between “acquisition” and 
“assimilation”, and considers the factors which promote these different responses. This offers 
insight into the process of assimilation, as well as promotes a meta-conceptual understanding for 
the assimilation of relativity. Chapter 3 considers the extent to which relativity has been acquired 
and assimilated. It begins by chronicling the acquisition of relativity, transitions into a discussion 
about the foundations of relativity, and concludes by analyzing the bidirectional influence(s) that 
relativity and our preexisting worldview have exerted on each other. Ultimately, this illuminates 
that our traditional understandings of “space”, “time”, “objectivity”, “truth”, and “reality” are 
deeply and fundamentally flawed. Chapter 4 explores the specific tensions between relativity and 
the traditional definition of “reality”. This involves a critical analysis of relativistic spacetime, 
and its subtle implications for our broader worldview. Chapter 4 concludes with an analysis of 
the heuristic value of agential realism, as well as a final reflection on probabilism, spacetime, 
relativity, and what these emphasize about the general assimilation of scientific information.  
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A Misunderstanding of Spacetime throughout “Space” and “Time” 
 “Since new paradigms are born from old ones, they ordinarily incorporate much of the 
vocabulary…that the traditional paradigm had previously employed. But they seldom employ 
these borrowed elements in quite the traditional way. Within the new paradigm, old terms, 
concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships one with the other. The inevitable result is 
what we must call, though the term is not quite right, a misunderstanding between the two 
competing schools…they are bound to partly talk through each other” –Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 148) 
Chapter 1: Rise and Fall of Classical Physics 
“In particular, that which is being evaded is the need for a cognitive structure radically different 
from the prior existing structure…a more realistic… [view of the] world in which the boundaries 
between subject and object are acknowledged to be never quite rigid, and in which knowledge, of 
any sort, is never quite total” -Evelyn Fox Keller (Keller 718) 
Section A- Prominence of Newtonian Thought 
As Max Jammer notes in “Concepts of Space”, pre-Newtonian science treated “space and 
time [as] being completely heterogeneous and non-interdependent entities” (Jammer 3). To 
exemplify this, he points out the “Galilean transformation of classical mechanics [in which] t’=t, 
that is, the transformed time variable is independent of the space variable.” (Jammer 3) 
Newtonian physics represents a major breakthrough in the sense that it was the first scientific 
model to formally connect the notions of space and time through the concept of motion. This was 
a “dramatic, theoretical innovation… [which shook science and scientists] loose from their 
theoretical moorings”; it was, as Kuhn would call it, a “paradigm shift” (Appleby 165, Kuhn 
111-134). Newton’s laws became the guiding principle for scientists who were “trying to explain 
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newly scrutinized or anomalous phenomena” (Kuhn 63). The interdependent yet ostensibly 
separable nature of space and time was a crucial tenet in Newton’s model. Accordingly, it 
became an ingrained component in the idealized “concrete problem-solution” which the 
professional scientific community used for “mapping domains of nature…to create credible 
expectations for the behavior of phenomena and thereby authorize programs for research.” 
(Kuhn 181) Newton’s way of thinking permeated not only the manner in which scientists would 
explore and explain natural phenomena; it also demarcated which questions would be 
“scientific” and supplied the terms in which scientific answers were to be expressed and 
understood. The remarkable success of Newtonian physics for understanding physical forces set 
the stage for a number of important scientific and technological breakthroughs, and remained the 
uncontested champion of physics for centuries. As a conceptual and analytical model for science, 
Newton’s mechanics seemed infallible. Many people came to the conclusion that there was 
nothing conceptually new to be discovered in physics, and that all that remained was more and 
more precise measurement. World-class physicist Albert Michelson asserted that the “important 
fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all been discovered”; he even went so far as 
to un-prophetically declare that “these are now so firmly established that the possibility of their 
ever being supplanted in consequence of new discoveries is exceedingly remote…our future 
discoveries…must be looked for in the sixth place of decimals.” (Kumar xiii) In this era of 
Newtonian absolutism and uninhibited scientific positivism, we were all too sure that we had 
uncovered the structure of reality, and that all that was left was to fill in the details. 
Section B- The Rise of “Uncertainty” via Probabilism 
Despite the ostensible scientific positivism, Olaf Hansen and Paul Croce make a 
compelling case that seeds of doubt and uncertainty were sown throughout the nineteenth 
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century. They characterize positivism as “more a belief of science watchers than of scientists”; 
the popularization of positivism amongst the general public stood in stark contrast to the 
developments that were occurring in science (Olaf and Croce 3). By the end of the nineteenth 
century, “epistemic certainty [had] largely disappeared from the intellectual and cultural 
landscape” of the professional scientific community, yet the general public continued to “cling 
willfully to conviction and simple commonsense facts.” (Olaf and Croce 3, 5) To characterize the 
developments in science under the blanket term “uncertainty”, however, gives a very misleading 
picture. Although many people inside and outside of the scientific community perceived a 
professional acceptance of uncertainty, scientists were increasingly embracing probabilism and 
not uncertainty per se. The difference between probabilism and uncertainty is subtle but 
essential. Probabilism sought to “tame chance” by “recognizing it and assuming its role in 
natural and social phenomena” (Olaf and Croce 7). Probabilists recognized that science could 
“extend its explanatory reach and build up its confidence with probabilistic patterns”; “in theory, 
the recognition of chance assumed more uncertainty [but] in practice the use of chance involved 
an increase of certainty through the manipulation and control of more of the natural and social 
world.” (Olaf and Croce 7) By admitting, embracing, and analyzing uncertainty on the level of 
the individual, probabilism enabled scientists to formulate statistical laws which acheived greater 
certainty on the macro-level. The “application of probability was not motivated by an embrace of 
uncertainty”, writes Olaf and Croce, but rather “by an enthusiasm for finding certainty within 
uncertainty.” (Olaf and Croce 7) It is more appropriate to say that scientists’ understanding of 
“certainty” became more complex and nuanced, than it is to say that scientists gave up their 
belief in and pursuit of “certainty”. Science uncovered new “truth” and “certainty” as 
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probabilism was gradually assimilated, but this process also indicated that concepts like 
“certainty”, “truth”, and “reality” are far more nuanced than their traditional definitions. 
One of the most significant scientific accomplishments to be born out of probabilism was 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection. In the past couples of centuries, Darwin’s model has 
revolutionized the way that biological scientists understand the development of a species. It also 
represents the “culmination of naturalistic trends in the sciences” and signifies “a novel approach 
to scientific explanation involving probabilities and hypotheses” (Olaf and Croce 99). Darwin’s 
theories “generated bitter and fundamental disagreement” not only because their implications 
regarding evolution contradicted tenets of traditional religion, but also because natural selection 
was a “hypothesis [built] on the basis of probability rather than proof” (Olaf and Croce 99). Even 
Darwin himself “struggled with his relation to the inductive method”, as he knew that “the nature 
of his scientific questions and the answers he proposed challenged the conventional goals of both 
religious belief and scientific theory.” (Olaf and Croce 104) Natural selection represented a 
radical departure from traditional scientific methodology, which deeply disturbed both religious 
and scientific thinkers. Accordingly, “the rise to prominence of Darwin’s theories…is not a tale 
of scientific triumph over the unscientific, but a story of the increasing persuasiveness of new 
scientific methods that looked only to nature for their theories and that replaced expectations of 
certainty and proof with persuasive and authoritative, yet probabilistic, explanations.” (Olaf and 
Croce 99) By admitting and accounting for uncertainty about the individual animal, Darwin’s 
theories enabled scientists to learn valuable information about the population as a whole. 
Unfortunately, the methodology of probabilism was not widely understood, especially 
outside of the professional scientific community. For many people, probabilism just seemed like 
a fancy synonym for uncertainty. In this era of mounting skepticism across all walks of life, 
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people had become tired of doubting. They did not want doubt, they wanted answers. Olaf and 
Croce note that “average citizens had been accustomed to turning to religious leaders and 
scientists for assurance about fundamental truths and ultimate meaning”, and were deeply 
discontent when their questions were met with “less final assurance from intellectual leaders and 
more frank inquiry among multiple viewpoints” (Olaf and Croce 5). The misinterpretation of 
scientific probabilism as a continuation of this trend towards doubt significantly weakened 
probabilism’s popular appeal. As William James notes in “The Meaning of Truth”, we “find it 
satisfactory to cease to doubt…above all we find consistency satisfactory” (James 192). Science 
continued to expand its horizons through the newfound power of probabilism during the 19th and 
20th centuries, but probabilistic explanations lacked absolute consistency on an individual scale. 
The scientific community was producing answers and explanations, but not ones that quelled the 
urge for traditional scientific “certainty”. Even the most complete and accurate probabilistic 
explanation could be considered entirely inadequate, if the primary criterion was to eliminate all 
doubt. Probabilism had opened Pandora’s Box; science progressed by recognizing and accepting 
underlying degrees of uncertainty, but scientists and the general public had to learn to live with 
that uncertainty. As probabilism was accepted and acquired, people had to reconcile it with their 
preexisting knowledge and beliefs. Probabilism and “uncertainty” have been internalized to 
varying extents, by different people, in different contexts, for different purposes. This process of 
assimilation has contributed to discrepancies, both within the scientific community and between 
scientists and the general public, as far as how to think about “certainty”, “truth”, and “reality”. 
When people lack a consensus about fundamental concepts such as these, the conflicts beliefs are 
typically deep-seated and the implications are far-reaching; it was only a matter of time until 
these discrepancies became apparent and problematic. Thus, although scientific positivism 
Schwartz	9	
proliferated in the 19th century as scientists continued to uncover “absolute truth”, it was quickly 
becoming evident that “truth” is more nuanced and relational than was traditionally recognized. 
Section C- Newtonian Absolutism and Anomalous Theories 
Newton’s mechanics are not easy to fully reconcile with probabilism. Basic applications 
of probabilism enrich and extend classical physics, but they also suggest fundamental 
weaknesses in the traditional Newtonian worldview. Probabilism recognizes an underlying 
degree of uncertainty and relativism, whereas Newton based his physics on a foundation of 
absolutism and traditional scientific “certainty”. Newton’s absolutist dogma is conceptually 
grounded in his understanding of space and time; from there, it spreads outwards and subtly 
permeates the rest of the Newtonian worldview. Newton’s physics were “founded…on the view 
that space is distinct from body and that time passes uniformly without regard to whether 
anything happens in the world.” (Rynasiewicz)1 In order “to distinguish these entities from the 
various ways by which we measure them (which he called relative spaces and relative times), 
Newton spoke of absolute space and absolute time” (Rynasiewicz). This view of spacetime is 
commonly referred to as substantivalism, because it treats space and time as though they are 
actual, substantial entities. In Newton’s understanding of the world, absolute space and time are 
as real as anything physical; space and time exist abstractly, as something above and beyond the 
matter, relationships, and coincidences that space and time contain. This belief is intuitively 
plausible, but deeply problematic when we consider later developments in science such as 
probabilism and Einstein’s work on relativity. Although our understanding of classical physics 
has been reconciled with anomalous theories in many ways, there are other ways in which 
classical physics has skewed and distorted our assimilation of new information. Science has 
																																								 																				
1	Online	source	without	page	numbers;	URL	is	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-stm/	
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gradually transitioned to a more probabilistic and relativistic worldview in the last century, yet 
the inherent weaknesses in the foundations of classical physics continue to plague us; to varying 
extents, neither scientists nor the general public have completely assimilated relativity and left 
behind the shortcomings from their preexisting models of the world. Newton’s understanding of 
space and time is a particularly critical shortcoming, as it provides the fundamental basis for 
ontological beliefs which embody excessive absolutism. The Newtonian model of “space” and 
“time” is inextricably tied to an entrenched absolutism that subtly spreads to the entirety of the 
Newtonian worldview, which in turn makes classical physics particularly difficult to reconcile 
with the nuance of probabilism and relativity. In situations like these, “involving development of 
ideas in which the consistent use of the traditional fundamental concepts leads us to paradoxes 
difficult to resolve”, notes Albert Einstein, “in the interests of science it is necessary over and 
over again to engage in the critique of these fundamental concepts, in order that we may not 
unconsciously be ruled by them.” (Jammer XIV) Reassessing our model of space and time is a 
crucial step towards reconciling the fundamental anomalies between classical physics and more 
recent scientific theories, but it is challenging to “give up [the classical paradigm] in toto” 
(Keller 720). Instead, like the frog which sits content in a slowly boiling pot of water until it 
burns to death, we have made minor alterations to the flawed notions of Newtonian space and 
time until the point at which paradox became inescapable. 
Section D- Space (A) and Space (B) 
Newton’s substantivalist foundation committed science to the view that space and time 
are external, inalterable entities. Newton was primarily concerned with explaining phenomena 
that took place in space when he wrote the Principia, as the notions of space and time had not yet 
been linked. “As far as classical conceptions of space are concerned, we may safely regard the 
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concept of space as an elementary and primary notion.” (Jammer 6) Since “the category of space 
preceded that of time”, “a discussion of space is preferable to that of time” in order to illuminate 
how “it is…possible…to think [about spacetime] in a different way.” (Jammer, XV) Einstein 
suggests that “the concept of space…was preceded by the psychologically simpler concept of 
place”, which in turn implies that space can be defined in two complementary ways. Einstein 
contrasts these two conceptions of space “as follows: (a) space as positional quality of the world 
of material objects; (b) space as container of all material objects”. (Jammer XV) There is not a 
significant substantive difference between these two definitions; they differ slightly in that (a) 
posits space to be a relationship of and between material objects whereas (b) implies then same, 
but also postulates space to be an additional entity in and of itself, external to material objects. 
Importantly, the relationships which are space (a) are deducible from the measurements and 
calculations made in terms of space (b). Space (b) is therefore a “logically more daring concept 
of space”, since space (b) presupposes the validity of space (a) (Jammer XV). Space (a), on the 
other hand, can be completely valid without the existence of space (b). These two conceptions of 
space are interrelated, yet are fundamentally different ways of understanding the relationship 
between the essence of space to/and the material objects that it contains. 
Despite the fact that “both space concepts are free creations of the human imagination, 
means devised for easier comprehension of our sense experience”, the success of Newton’s 
physics led people to recognize space (b) without understanding or considering space (a) 
(Jammer XV). The Newtonian model predisposed scientists and the general public to consider 
space (b) as “reality”, and space (a) as a mere consequence of that reality. Although space (a) 
and space (b) tend to produce similar empirical results, unequivocally prioritizing (b) over (a) 
results in profound restrictions on the way that we understand and quantify our observations. 
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There are significant conceptual implications that result from the belief that space (a) is nothing 
more than a derivative of “absolute space”, space (b); by espousing (b) and eschewing (a), we 
have inhibited our ability to fully and coherently make sense of the world around us. Although 
the Newtonian model of space proved “indispensable for the development of theory…it has 
required…strenuous exertions subsequently to overcome this concept [of absolute space] – a 
process which is by no means yet completed.” (Jammer XVI) This leaves us with two important 
questions. First, why did Newton classify space as type (b)? Second, what are the implications of 
an understanding of space as strictly type (b)? We will consider each of these questions in turn. 
Section E- Absolute Space in Newtonian Mechanics 
If Newton’s “forces” were just describing the spatial relationship of objects that exist in 
space of type (a), then why did Newton’s worldview posit the existence of absolute space? There 
was one particularly significant scientific motivation for doing so. In order “to give the classical 
principle of inertia (and therewith the classical law of motion) an exact meaning”, notes Einstein, 
“space must be introduced as the independent cause of the inertial behavior of bodies” (Jammer 
XVI). Newton posited space (b) for the sake of clarity and convenience, not out of logical 
necessity. “It was clear to Newton that the space concept (a) was not sufficient to serve as the 
foundation for the inertia principle and the law of motion”; although he felt uneasy about doing 
so, he defined physical space as type (b) (Jammer XVI). In Newton’s theories, “space is not only 
introduced as an independent thing apart from material object, but also is assigned an absolute 
role in the whole causal structure of theory…in the sense that space acts on all material objects, 
while these do not in turn exert any reaction on space.” (Jammer XVI) The success of Newton’s 
physics would ensure that “space of type (b) was generally accepted by scientists”, despite the 
fact that “it required a severe struggle to arrive at the concept of independent and absolute space” 
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(Jammer XVI). This model of space was heuristically useful for the scientific community, but it 
is seldom recognized that it was a practical choice rather than a necessary truth. 
Significantly, a large part of Newton’s motivation for positing the existence of space (b) 
(“absolute space”) was non-scientific. It is important to remember that Newton lived in an era 
when religion held a great deal of influence and did not react kindly to challengers. In the 
1600’s, the Catholic Church was extremely powerful and the Spanish Inquisition was in full 
swing. “At the time Newton composed the Principia”, notes Ryan Rynasiewicz, “Galileo’s 
condemnation by the Catholic Church for asserting that the earth is in motion was still recent 
history” (Rynasiewicz). Although Newton considered “absolute space…a logical and ontological 
necessity”, the motivation behind this was pragmatic and religious rather than scientific (Jammer 
101). Newton recognized that the earth was in motion, but it was imperative that his framework 
be compatible with religious doctrine. “In anticipation…[of] how to reconcile this with 
scripture”, Newton posited that “in ordinary discourse (including the Bible) the terms ‘time’, 
‘space’, ‘place’, and ‘motion’ are properly understood to signify the relative quantities; only in 
specialized and mathematical contexts do they denote the absolute quantities.” (Rynasiewicz). In 
the Scholium, Newton’s “stated intention…is to maintain that absolute space, time, and motion 
are genuinely distinct from their relative counterparts.” (Rynasiewicz) Newton needed to invoke 
the concept of absolute space in order to avoid religious persecution; accordingly, as Jammer 
notes, “all Newton’s achievements and discoveries in the realm of physics are in his view 
subordinate to the philosophical conception of absolute space.” (Jammer 116) 
Additionally, this “stated intention” was reinforced by the fact that Newton himself was a 
religious man. Newton was not only trying to reconcile his theories with scripture in order to 
satisfy religious leaders, but to accommodate his own religious beliefs as well. While he was 
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“intimately acquainted with the problems of religion and metaphysics, Newton managed to keep 
them in a separate compartment of his mind, but for one exception, namely, his theory of space.” 
(Jammer 98) Newton’s synthesis of science and religion through the concept of absolute space 
was “deeply influenced…by More’s criticisms of Descartes”, which assert that “God is extended 
in his own way…space is distinct from matter because it is extended but penetrable, whereas 
matter is extended but impenetrable; and, in tandem, all substances are extended, but whereas 
some, such as tables and chairs, are impenetrable, others, such as the mind and even God, are 
penetrable and therefore not material.” (Janiak)2 The religious basis for Newton’s work is 
explicit on page 544 of the Principia, where he writes that “He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent 
and omniscient; that is, his duration reaches from eternity to eternity; his presence from infinity 
to infinity; he governs all things, and knows all things that are or can be done. He is not eternity 
and infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. 
He endures for ever, and is everywhere present; and by existing always and everywhere, he 
constitutes duration and space.” (Jammer 113) Reflecting on this passage, Jammer notes that 
“Newton identifies space and time with God’s attributes.” (Jammer 113). The distinction 
between relative and absolute space allowed Newton to appease religious leaders, made room for 
his own religious beliefs, and “rendered…the Principia a completeness, as a cosmology… [by 
giving] the foundations of mechanics and mathematical physics a theological justification, 
[which was] an idea congenial to Newton” (Jammer 115). Absolute space and time were an 
instrumentally useful, but logically uncompelled, scientific foundation constructed by Newton. 
 While the foundation of Newton’s substantivalism was epistemologically shaky, it held 
empirical benefits which made it difficult to dispense of. In particular, the concept of absolute 
																																								 																				
2	Online	source	without	page	numbers;	URL	is	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-philosophy/	
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space and time served to clarify Newton’s laws of motion. Although forces have become a well-
known element of science, “Newton’s canonical notion of a force” or “an ‘action exerted on a 
body’ that changes its state of motion…was a confusing notion at the time.” (Janiak) Remember, 
“when Newton wrote the Principia…he was not contributing to a preexisting field of study called 
mathematical physics; he was attempting to show how philosophers could employ various 
mathematical and experimental methods in order to reach conclusion about nature, especially 
about the motions of material bodies…the Principia represented his attempt to reorient natural 
philosophy” (Janiak). Newton was bound to face an uphill battle because people were 
accustomed to thinking in terms of Cartesian natural philosophy, in which “the concept of a force 
plays little if any role” because “all natural change is due to the impacts that material bodies 
make upon one another’s surfaces.” (Janiak) By placing “the concept of a force at the very center 
of his thinking about motion and its causes”, Newton’s framework represented a fundamental 
shift from the past (Janiak). Unfortunately, this idea was confusing to many of Newton’s readers; 
the easiest way for other scientists and the general public to make sense of Newton’s forces was 
to ignore the conceptual issue and focus on the technical applications. By “bracketing the 
question of how to understand forces as ephemeral actions that do not persist after causal 
interactions have ceased, one can make progress by conceiving of forces as quantities.” (Janiak) 
As a result, Newton’s forces were not seen as the well-developed and “sophisticated notion of 
modern physics”, but rather “an absolutely given entity, a real physical being” as opposed to “a 
mathematical abstraction” (Jammer 99). The quantification of forces helped Newton’s readers to 
apply his mechanics in mathematical and practical contexts, but the tradeoff was that the 
Newtonian model’s conceptual foundations were glossed over and poorly understood. 
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Importantly, this was not quite the same way that Newton himself understood forces. 
Newton had a more “abstract way of understanding forces…without involving any...physical 
interaction, Newton thought of forces as quantities that are proportional to other features of 
nature.” (Janiak) Although Newton had posited a space of type (b), it seems as though he 
recognized that physics was based on relationships from space (a) rather than inherent physical 
properties. This is evident from his conclusions regarding the fact “that the sun and the earth 
interact according to this law of gravity.” (Janiak) Faced with the question of “how…we know 
that the sun contains a quantity of matter, that it is a material body with the same basic qualities 
that characterize the earth or the moon?”, Newton cited the relationship between the sun and the 
earth and claimed that we can “infer from finding these properties in the bodies that we have 
seen” (Janiak). In this sense, Newton recognized that science is based on deductions about 
properties and objects, derived from relationships and relative truths. Newton is more explicit 
about this methodology in his conclusion about gravity in proposition seven of Book III of the 
Principia, where he notes that we deduce the qualities of material objects from the interaction of 
those objects. Newton considered this “the ‘foundation’ of natural philosophy.” (Janiak) From 
our “perceptions and experiments that provide us with knowledge of the objects and natural 
phenomena in our neck of the universe…we [can] reach a conclusion concerning objects and 
phenomena throughout the rest of the universe” (Janiak). Although absolute space (in other 
words, space of “type (b)”) was useful for popularizing and applying Newtonian physics, it made 
it that much easier to lose sight of the fact that “space” in physics is fundamentally concerned 
with spatial and spatiotemporal relationships rather than material objects per se. 
Section F- Implications of Space (A) and Space (B) 
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It is easier to consider space of type (b) first, since Newtonian physics has made us more 
familiar with this definition of space. Einstein invites us to consider the example of placing food 
such as rice or cherries into a box; if we consider space of type (b), then the amount of food 
which can fit would be “the ‘space’ of the box”; this “property must be considered ‘real’ in the 
same sense as the box itself.” (Jammer XV) In this way, the concept of space is no longer 
completely relational; it “achieves a meaning which is freed from any connection with a 
particular material object.” (Jammer XV) It seems as though some underhand trickery is at play 
here; is it not the case that space is still relational, and just that the relation is now between two 
material objects rather than by a “connection with a particular material object”? (Jammer XV) 
This means of arriving at an absolute space seems suspicious at best, but the problem resides in 
the notion of absolute space rather than Einstein’s example. By extending this concept “of ‘box 
space’ one can arrive at the concept of an independent (absolute) space, unlimited in extent, in 
which all material objects are contained.” (Jammer XV) It would follow logically from this 
absolute space that a material object must always be situated in space, and “in the framework of 
this concept formation it is quite conceivable that an empty space may exist.” (Jammer XV) 
On the other hand, if we consider space of type (a) then we recognize that “place is first 
of all a (small) portion of the earth’s surface identified by a name” and that “the thing whose 
‘place’ is being specified is a material object or…group of material objects.” (Jammer XV) 
Accordingly, “one is led to the view that space is a sort of order of material objects and nothing 
else.” (Jammer XV, my italics) Space is a relation of sorts, and thus cannot be “empty” or “full” 
regardless of the presence and absence of material objects. Understanding space in this manner, 
“one is led quite naturally to reject the concept of empty space” (Jammer, XV). In short, space 
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(a) is understood to measure the relationship of and between material objects, whereas space (b) 
is understood to be an external and absolute entity which contains material objects. 
Returning to Einstein’s example of the box of cherries, how would our ideas about what 
is “real” change between space (b) and space (a)? In space (b), space takes on an absolute nature, 
so first and foremost absolute space would have to exist. The cherries and the box each have 
certain spatial properties; the relationship between them depends on their spatial extensions. 
Accordingly, the material objects (the cherries and box) are fundamental physical entities which 
serve as measurements of absolute space, and the relationship between them is less “real” 
because it is contingent on their preexisting properties. But how can this be, if the relationship 
between their properties was the basis that was used to establish the existence of absolute space 
in the first place? The logic of space (b) seems viciously circular. In space (a), on the other hand, 
space is not an absolute or independent entity. Put simply, space is a measure of the relationship 
between material objects; it “is a sort of order of material objects and nothing else.” (Jammer 
XV) According to space (a), this order is the most fundamental building block of reality. Thus, 
space (a) accounts for the relationship(s) between one object and another, but does not depend on 
an absolute scale for measurement nor absolute properties of the material object themselves. 
In space (b), we posit real objects in real absolute space in order to deduce relationships. 
In space (a), objects and space are interdependent; the most “real” thing is relationships, from 
which we can make deductions. Is it the case that we can only fit 10 “x” in “y” because “y” is 10 
times larger than “x”? Or is it the case that these cherries have a certain measurement in absolute 
space, and this box has a certain measurement in absolute space, and because the measurement 
of the box is 10x larger (in terms of absolute space) than the measurement of the cherry (in terms 
of absolute space), that we can only fit 10 cherries in the box? In both cases we can fit 10 
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cherries in the box, but the resort to absolute quantifications in the latter adds a few extra steps 
which are unnecessary for answering the question of “how many cherries can fit in the box?” 
From the assumption that the cherries and the box are more “real” than the relationship 
between them, we are forced to take a roundabout method in order to solve certain problems. 
Reverting to an absolute scale for measurement does have its advantages, particularly that 
it provides a universal standard for making empirical comparisons. Nevertheless, the notion of 
“objective” measurements and imposing an absolute scale reinforces the epistemological mistake 
that physics is based on spatial properties of material objects rather than the spatial relationship 
between them. This contributes to our understanding of the physical world as something external 
to human minds and bodies, which in turn carries profound implications for conceptualizing 
“truth” and “reality”. Newtonian physics forces us to revise our experiences so that they can be 
understood as valid scientific observations, “but once it is on the table it feels right.” (Griffiths 
39) Classical physics is not identical to our everyday experiences, but “it seems consistent with 
our everyday experience…[it] refines and perfects our intuitions, but it doesn’t upset them.” 
(Griffiths 39) Our understanding of reality as absolute, external, and separable into the distinct 
entities of space and time has become a deeply ingrained intuition; this results in fundamental 
conflicts when we try to make sense of relativity. In response to Einstein’s revolutionary work on 
relativity, we unjustifiably glossed over those conflicts and maintained a largely traditional view 
of reality. Although relativity should “seem to contradict everything we thought we understood” 
and undermine “everything we took for granted about the world”, the full impact of relativity 
was not felt by most (Griffiths 39). Even Einstein himself synthesized relativity with the familiar 
Newtonian model, rather than replacing it outright. This was a wide-reaching trend; worldviews 
were revised in consideration of relativity, but they were not radically changed. Einstein’s work 
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on relativity was undoubtedly revolutionary, but its true significance was underappreciated and 
misappropriated as people held on to a largely classical view of reality. In this sense, relativity 
represents a wealth of “knowledge acquired, but not yet assimilated.” (Evelyn Fox Keller 718) 
Chapter 2: Assimilation of Scientific Knowledge 
“The mathematics of relativity is on the whole quite simple, the much advertised difficulties of 
the theory residing mostly in its physical implications, which run counter to some of our most 
cherished everyday notions…. relativity talks endlessly of space and time, and simultaneity and 
other familiar things. One forgets all too easily that such things are of the first importance for 
physical science; that they are part of that shaky foundation on which is balanced the whole 
intricate and beautiful structure of scientific theory and philosophical thought. To tamper with 
them is to send a shudder coursing from one end of this vast frame to the other. And to effect 
successfully a profound change in our ideas concerning them, as Einstein did, is to create a 
revolution in science and philosophy of transcendental importance”-Banesh Hoffman (Hoffman 5) 
Section A- Introduction 
What does it mean to say that relativity represents a wealth of “knowledge acquired, but 
not yet assimilated”? (Keller 718) This is an important statement, and it deserves to be unpacked 
and examined a little bit more closely. “Assimilation”, broadly defined, means “to take in and 
incorporate as one’s own; to absorb” (Dictionary.com). In the context of scientific theories, 
“assimilation” refers to the way, and extent, to which a theory (such as relativity) is incorporated 
into one’s larger understanding of science and reality. In the century since Einstein published the 
special and general theories of relativity, how has relativity changed our understanding of the 
world? In what ways has it been assimilated, and in what ways has it been repressed? 
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Section B- Acquiring Relativity and Piaget’s Theory of Cognition 
Keller uses the term “assimilated” because she is drawing on the theories developed by 
child psychologist Jean Piaget. Assimilation and accommodation are “two of the basic concepts 
of Piaget’s theory of cognition”, but his use of these terms “is not quite the same as their 
common use” because they are used “in the context of his constructivist theory of knowing.” 
(Glasersfeld 126) Piaget asserts that knowledge is acquired by constructing “schemes” which 
consist “of three parts: recognition of a certain situation, association of a specific activity [or 
outcome] with that” situation, and the “expectation of a certain result.” (Glasersfeld 127) 
Consider an infant who picks up a spoon and shakes it, expecting the sound that occurs when he 
shakes his toy rattle. “We call that item a spoon and may say that the infant is assimilating it to 
its rattling scheme; but from the infant’s perspective at that point, the item is a rattle, because 
what the infant perceives of it is not what an adult would consider the characteristics of a spoon 
but just those aspects that fit the rattling scheme.” (Glasersfeld 127) When “shaking the 
spoon…does not produce the result the infant expects…this may lead to the perception of some 
aspect that will enable the infant in the future to recognize spoons as non-rattles.” (Glasersfeld 
127) Piaget refers to unexpected results (in this case, the lack of a rattling noise) and the 
emotions that they incite as “perturbations”, which then inspire different cognitive changes or 
“accommodations”. The “theory that emerges from Piaget’s work can be summarized by saying 
that cognitive change…take[s] place when a scheme, instead of producing the expected result, 
leads to perturbation, and perturbation, in turn, leads to accommodation that establishes a new 
equilibrium.” (Glasersfeld 128) The establishment of an appropriate equilibrium is a crucial 
accomplishment, without which data and theories cannot be said to be “completely assimilated”.  
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This fundamental difference between “acquisition” and “assimilation” is reflected in 
Hymses’s model of “communicative competence”, which differentiates “between the ability to 
master grammar and words” and “the achievement of a competent understanding of the meaning 
involved with using a particular discourse.” (Brown 829) The ability to use grammar and words 
is proof of the acquisition of these “tools of language”, but the complete assimilation of a 
language can only occur once the speaker has “communicative competence” which “involves 
developing a mastery of the tools of language along with obtaining an understanding of the 
social, political, and interpersonal significance of using those words.” (Brown 829) This points to 
a key distinction: assimilation is much more thorough than acquisition. The acquisition of 
knowledge occurs pretty much anytime that data is analyzed and responded to, whereas the 
assimilation of knowledge requires a more in depth comprehension of data and its integration 
into broader theories and worldviews. Thus, to “completely assimilate” scientific data, the data 
must be analyzed and there must be a theory (either new or preexisting) that accounts for, 
incorporates, and explains the assimilated data. To “completely assimilate” a scientific theory, 
the theory and any ensuing “accommodations” must be unpacked and there must be a worldview 
(either new or preexisting) that accounts for, incorporates, and explains the assimilated theory. 
 Relativity has incited various accommodations in the worldview of the scientific 
community. As David Griffiths notes, relativity “takes precedence over all other theories… 
[because] it is a theory of space and time themselves.” (Griffiths 39) Professional scientists, 
particularly physicists, have made countless revisions to their mathematical model of the world 
in order to accommodate and integrate relativity; although relativity derives from two conceptual 
tenets and has significant theoretical implications, it has primarily been assimilated as a 
mathematical theory. Science and technology have prospered greatly from incorporating the 
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insight that relativity has to offer. Relativity has enabled techno-scientific breakthroughs 
including GPS technology, the creation of the atomic bomb, and a more thorough exploration of 
astronomical phenomena including black holes, gravity waves, the cosmic big bang, and many 
more. In light of relativity, new relationships were recognized and old terms were linked in 
significant and unexpected ways. The inextricable linkage of space and time revolutionized 
scientists’ mathematical model of the world, which in turn enabled them to recognize that length 
and duration are relative rather than absolute, that energy and mass are intimately related, and 
that the notion of absolute simultaneity is deeply and fundamentally mistaken. Scientists’ 
mathematical framework is dominated by the theories of relativity, and their conceptual 
understanding of the world is beginning to shift in response to that mathematical model. 
Piaget suggests two distinct yet intricately related levels on which assimilation occurs. 
For the first, “the sensory-motor level, action schemes are instrumental in helping organisms to 
achieve goals in their interaction with the experiential world.” (Glasersfeld 128) On the second 
level, “reflective abstraction, operative schemes are instrumental in helping organisms achieve a 
coherent conceptual network that reflect the paths of acting as well as thinking which, at the 
organism’s present point of experience, have turned out to be viable.” (Glasersfeld 128) Piaget’s 
analysis is revolutionary because it asserts that the instrumental function of our conceptual 
network of “reflective abstraction” is “strictly epistemic”, and therefore this “entails a radical 
shift in the conception of knowledge…that substitutes viability in the experiential world for 
correspondence with ontological reality” (Glasersfeld 129). This “conception of knowledge and 
of its relation to the ‘real’ world” is referred to as a “constructivist epistemology” (Glasersfeld 
123). Constructivism puts a distinct twist on the traditional notions of “objectivity”, “truth”, and 
“reality”; these phenomena are “not preexistence (in the ontological sense) or the preexistent 
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made manifest to the cognitive mind (in the epistemological sense)” but rather are created and 
constructed through “our participation with/in and as part of the world’s differential becoming.” 
(Barad 361) Piaget stipulates that scientific “knowledge must not be considered an objective 
representation of an external observer-independent environment…the fact that scientific 
knowledge enables us to cope does not justify the belief that scientific knowledge provides a 
picture of the world that corresponds to an absolute reality.” (Glasersfeld 135) According to 
Piaget’s theory of cognition, “knowledge…is never (and can never be) a “representation” of the 
real world” but is rather an attempt to satisfy “the goal of constructing a relatively reliable and 
coherent model of individual experiential worlds” (Glasersfeld 125, 138). Thus, the complete 
assimilation of a scientific theory into a broader worldview “is a matter of fit rather than 
match…[which] means no less but also no more than to have built up a conceptual structure 
that…appears to be compatible” with the data and theory being assimilated (Glasersfeld 134). 
Scientists have come to acknowledge many points of tension between relativity and 
classical physics; Einstein’s mathematical framework of relativity suggests the need for a 
predominantly relational understanding of knowledge and reality, which does not fit neatly with 
the absolutist tenets of Newtonian mechanics. As a “theory of space and time themselves”, the 
implications of relativity are far reaching and areas of tension with Newtonian physics are both 
numerous and subtle (Griffiths 39). However, these tensions are typically dealt with by revising 
the Newtonian model rather than replacing it outright. The example of “mass” and “energy” is 
demonstrative of scientists’ general approach to reconciling relativity with the existing scientific 
worldview. Mass and energy, which were completely distinct concepts in Newtonian mechanics, 
were recognized by Einsteinian relativity to be intimately related through the famous equation 
E=mc2. Although this suggests that mass and energy are secondary concepts, arbitrarily divided 
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from the larger, inseparable reality of mass-energy, these concepts continue to be taught in many 
disciplines of science as well as used in everyday life. We have surely refined our understanding 
of mass and energy; physicists frequently acknowledge that there is a relationship between mass 
and energy, and account for relativity’s effects on their practical applications of science, yet 
nevertheless the concepts of mass and energy remain more intuitive and real to most people than 
relativistic “mass-energy”. This emphasizes two setbacks regarding the assimilation of relativity 
into our scientific worldview, which has long been dominated by Newtonian physics. First, this 
illuminates that scientists use relativity to revise, rather than replace, their largely Newtonian 
worldviews. Although our scientific views change our understanding of the world, it is essential 
to recognize that our preexisting understanding of the world also exerts an influence on the way 
that we build and interpret scientific models. The influence between science and society is not 
simple and unidirectional, but is rather a complex feedback loop which flows both ways. Second, 
the example of “mass” and “energy” points to a crucial tension within science. While the 
mathematical side of science is largely dominated by relativity, the conceptual components in 
science remain conflicted between the revolutionary knowledge acquired from relativity, and the 
more familiar Newtonian model of the world. This puts science in a weird place; although 
relativity has enabled a deeper mathematical understanding of the world, science and scientists 
often lack the conceptual clarity, theoretical framework, and adequate vocabulary to fully 
express and interpret the significance of that mathematical model. Analogous to how Newton’s 
forces could initially be quantified but not conceptually understood, scientists have begun to 
master the technical applications of relativity without a comprehensive understanding of 
relativity’s philosophical foundation and conceptual implications. It is in this sense that the 
knowledge of relativity has been acquired but not fully assimilated, as “the vision implicit in” 
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Einstein’s theory of relativity “still awaits representation in a cognitive paradigm yet more 
radical than the conventional interpretations have offered us.” (Keller 721) 
Section C- Responding to Anomalous Data 
Clark Chinn and William Brewer supply an invaluable theoretical framework for 
exploring and explaining the partial assimilation of relativity into our worldview in “The Role of 
Anomalous Data in Knowledge Acquisition”. What are the different ways in which scientists and 
science “students respond when they encounter scientific information that contradicts their 
current theories about the physical world?” (Chinn and Brewer 1). They note that assimilating 
anomalous data and choosing between scientific theories “can never logically compel a scientist 
to abandon a particular hypothesis because the hypothesis is embedded in a network of beliefs, 
any one of which might be wrong.” (Chinn and Brewer 10) “Abandoning or modifying beliefs in 
the face of new, conflicting data and ideas” is a cautious and calculated decision for scientists, 
because “it is frequently more rational to discredit anomalous data than to change theories” in the 
“endeavor to coordinate theory and data.” (Chinn and Brewer 31, 1, 13) Similarly, scientists and 
nonscientists frequently repress, reinterpret, misunderstand, and partially assimilate theories that 
cannot be integrated into a coherent worldview. When presented with anomalous data, “there are 
seven basic responses: ignore the anomalous data, reject the data, exclude the data from the 
domain of theory A, hold the data in abeyance, reinterpret the data while retaining theory A, 
reinterpret the data and make peripheral changes to theory A, and accept the data and change 
theory A, possibly in favor of theory B.” (Chinn and Brewer 4) The assimilation of relativity into 
science and scientists’ worldviews cannot be simplified to one of these seven responses, because 
relativity is not a single piece of data but rather a dense theory consisting of countless data which 
are assimilated, repressed, and understood to varying degrees (Latour 158-175). 
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“In order to coordinate new anomalous data with an existing theory”, there are “three 
decisions [which] must be made, either implicitly or explicitly...whether the individual accepts 
the data as valid, whether the individual can provide an explanation for why the data are 
accepted or not accepted, and whether the individual changes his or her prior theory.” (Chinn and 
Brewer 13) If a theory is accepted, then the individual must figure out how to incorporate it into 
their existing worldview. Which of the theory’s data are expected, and which are anomalous? 
How can those anomalies be explained? Which other beliefs and theories are called into question 
if those anomalies cannot be accounted for? When these points of conflict become apparent and 
irresolvable, one side has to give. Where the new theory and the existing worldview conflict, one 
side will inevitably be ignored, rejected, excluded, held in abeyance, reinterpreted, or accepted in 
a peripheral manner. Conflict is not inevitable; in many instances, particularly when inertial 
reference frames are moving much slower than the speed of light, the data from the theory of 
relativity match perfectly with the preexisting scientific worldview. When conflicts do occur, it 
is not an all-or-nothing matter as to which side is accepted, because the theory of relativity 
consists of countless data. Rather, it varies within each case and on a case-by-case basis. There 
are some ways in which relativity has tangibly and significantly changed our prior understanding 
of science, but other ways in which the preexisting scientific worldview still dominates. 
Relativity represents “knowledge acquired, but not yet assimilated” because it is only partially 
incorporated into our broader worldview; although it has technically been accepted by the 
professional scientific community, both scientists and the general public are still in the process of 
fitting it into their broader understanding of “reality” (Keller 718). There are two separate issues 
which are essential for exploring the assimilation of relativity into our preexisting worldview. 
First, to what extent has relativity been assimilated into the preexisting scientific worldview? 
Schwartz	28	
Second, to what extent is science assimilated into different peoples’ understanding of “reality”? 
The process of assimilating relativity largely revolves around the crucial tensions between 
relativity and the preexisting scientific worldview, but it also raises challenging and important 
questions about how science fits into a broader worldview. 
Section D- Factors that Influence the Response to Anomalous Data 
 Chinn and Brewer “propose that there are four key components that interact to determine 
how people respond to anomalous data: an individual’s prior knowledge, a possible alternative 
theory, the anomalous data, and the processing strategies that guide the evaluation of the 
anomalous data.” (Chinn and Brewer 14) A critical examination of these factors will illuminate 
the difficulties of fully assimilating relativity into a broader understanding of reality, as well as 
suggesting how and why relativity has been assimilated to varying extents, by different groups of 
people, in different contexts and ways. I will now look at each of these four components in turn. 
 Prior knowledge is a paramount factor for analyzing anomalous data, choosing between 
scientific theories, and integrating those theories into preexisting worldviews. Prior knowledge 
enables data and theories to be recognized as “anomalous”, and provides a crucial foundation for 
figuring out how to deal with those anomalies. Chinn and Brewer cite “four characteristics of 
prior belief that are especially important in influencing how an individual responds to anomalous 
information: the entrenchment of the individual’s current theory, the individual’s ontological 
beliefs, the individual’s epistemological commitments, and the individual’s background 
knowledge.” (Chinn and Brewer 14) It is tough to reconcile relativity with the preexisting 
scientific worldview because Newtonian concepts and theories are deeply entrenched in that 
worldview. “An entrenched theory…contains one or more deeply entrenched beliefs… [which 
are] deeply embedded in a network of other beliefs…and participates in a broad range of 
Schwartz	29	
explanations in various domains.” (Chinn and Brewer 15) Generally, “the more entrenched a 
belief, the harder it [is]… to persuade an individual to change the belief.” (Chinn and Brewer 15) 
The unequivocal acceptance of relativity would have massive ripple effects on the preexisting 
scientific worldview, because that worldview contains numerous deeply entrenched beliefs and 
theories which do not fit with relativity. Even though relativity is mathematically accepted, the 
assimilation of that knowledge into our scientific and general worldview poses further challenges 
since the implications of relativity “run counter to some of our most cherished everyday notions” 
(Hoffman 5). When the cause of the entrenchment is subtle and the application of the entrenched 
theory is widespread, as is the case with Newtonian physics, preexisting beliefs are especially 
hard to give up. Chinn and Brewer specifically note that the beliefs challenged by “the domains 
of special relativity and quantum mechanics” are subtle and pervasive, and therefore tensions 
with special relativity and quantum mechanics are more likely to lead to “rejection, exclusion, 
abeyance, reinterpretation, and/or peripheral change” rather than complete assimilation and the 
“abandoning [of]…entrenched beliefs.” (Chinn and Brewer 16) When a theory or “schema 
is…embedded in evidentiary support and is used to support a wide range of other theories and 
observations that the person believes”, it is more challenging to assimilate an anomalous theory 
and maintain a coherent worldview because the areas of conflict are subtle and diverse (Chinn 
and Brewer 17). Ontological beliefs, which Chinn and Brewer define as “beliefs about the 
fundamental categories and properties of the world”, are “one class of theoretical beliefs that is 
so deeply entrenched that it deserves special mention…these beliefs are used to support ideas 
across many domains or subdomains and…are remote from experience”, which makes them 
“very hard to change.” (Chinn and Brewer 17) Again, they cite the pre-relativistic beliefs “that 
objects…move along a single discrete path” and “that time flows at a constant rate regardless of 
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relative motion” as “mistaken ontological beliefs that have been” particularly resistant to change 
(Chinn and Brewer 17). Many of our basic ontological beliefs have a heavy Newtonian 
influence, which “not only lead students to reject accepted scientific ideas but also make it 
difficult for the students to even comprehend the accepted scientific ideas.” (Chinn and Brewer 
17) This difficulty is further compounded by our conflicting and unclear epistemological 
commitments. As far as accepting the mathematical paradigm of relativity, the epistemology is 
straightforward; there is compelling evidence that relativity is a valid scientific theory. 
Integrating this theory into our scientific concepts and our broader worldview, however, raises 
extremely complex questions about the epistemology of reality and the metaphysical significance 
of science as a discipline. This calls for a much more holistic understanding of science, in which 
“the more traditional theoretic side of science must be supplemented with a plurality of relevant 
metascientific aspects.” (Tuss 456) Accordingly, the complete assimilation of relativity into our 
broad worldview would require both the conceptual assimilation of relativity and a complicated 
philosophical judgement about the role of science in understanding and interpreting reality. In 
addition to entrenchment of prior beliefs, ontological beliefs, and epistemological commitments, 
“an individual’s background knowledge is an extremely potent factor” in the assimilation of a 
scientific theory (Chinn and Brewer 18). Chinn and Brewer characterize background knowledge 
as “scientific knowledge that an individual assumes to be valid but that is not specifically part of 
the theory under evaluation”, and assert that “an individual’s background knowledge can have 
very different effects on how the individual responds to anomalous data” depending on its 
contents (Chinn and Brewer 18). If an individual has a wealth of background knowledge, then 
they will often “reject or reinterpret anomalous data”, but “if an individual possesses too little 
background knowledge, [then] he or she will not even be able to understand that the anomalous 
Schwartz	31	
data are anomalous.” (Chinn and Brewer 20) Similarly, background theories (such as deeply 
entrenched beliefs, ontological beliefs, and epistemological commitments) have an important 
influence on the assimilation of an anomalous theory into a worldview. In order to fully 
assimilate a scientific theory, an individual must have enough background knowledge to 
recognize a theory as anomalous and incorporate that theory into a coherent worldview, without 
having so much background knowledge that his/her worldview is rigid and inflexible. This 
highlights a substantial roadblock regarding the complete assimilation of relativity; if an 
individual has enough background knowledge to understand relativity and unravel some of its 
philosophical implications, then his/her scientific and general worldviews must already be richly 
detailed. This level of sophistication, in the wake of Newtonian physics, all but ensures that there 
will be certain components of the preexisting worldview that are both deeply entrenched, 
ontologically mistaken, and fundamentally in conflict with relativity. Because of these deep-
seated anomalies, the assimilation of relativity into our worldview inevitably leads back to 
complicated questions about ontology and the epistemological role of science in “reality”. 
 In addition to an individual’s prior knowledge, the availability of an alternative is an 
essential influence on the possibility of changing a theory or worldview. Chinn and Brewer 
identify “the availability of a plausible alternative”, “the quality of the alternative”, and “the 
intelligibility of the alternative” as some of the most important factors for “informed theory 
change” in science (Chinn and Brewer 21). They note that “the history of science shows that 
scientists frequently choose to make theory-preserving responses to anomalous data when the 
data are not accompanied by a plausible theory…[with] a plausible physical mechanism.” (Chinn 
and Brewer 21) Scientists typically cling to their theories in the face of anomalous data, if those 
anomalous data cannot be incorporated into a coherent alternative theory. This response involves 
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a consideration of the framework that the data implies and fits into, as well as the analysis of the 
data itself. Assimilating an anomalous theory into a broader worldview requires a consideration 
of similar factors, but on a larger scale. If the scientific theory is unequivocally accepted, can it 
be assimilated alongside preexisting beliefs to create a coherent worldview? Akin to how 
scientists resist theory change in the face of anomalous data without a corresponding theory, 
scientists and the nonscientists resist modifying their worldviews in the face of an anomalous 
scientific theory that cannot be completely assimilated into an alternative worldview. Assessing 
the overall coherency of the alternative worldview provides a vital measure of the plausibility, 
quality, and intelligibility of that theory; thus, to better understand the assimilation of relativity, 
it is imperative to consider not only the internal coherency of relativity but also how it interacts 
with and impacts our prior beliefs. The extent to which relativity is assimilated varies greatly 
between different contexts and different groups of people, because preexisting knowledge and 
the rigidity of preexisting worldviews vary greatly to begin with. Relativity has been partially 
assimilated in most scientific contexts because it is mathematically accessible and increases the 
“accuracy, scope, and consistency” of science and its practical applications (Chinn and Brewer 
21). The mathematical component of relativity is intelligible, which in turn allows scientists to 
discern that relativity is both plausible and higher quality than the prior mathematical model that 
guided physical science. The complete assimilation of relativity into science and our broader 
worldview, however, requires the fundamental understanding and integration of relativity’s 
conceptual and philosophical implications as well as its mathematical structure. The complicated 
metaphysical questions that are raised by relativity make it extremely challenging to assess the 
plausibility and quality of relativity as a conceptual framework. We have teased out a few of 
relativity’s conceptual implications by applying it mathematically and scrutinizing the results, 
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but the “axiomatic formalization of the mathematical foundations” and their “implications…for 
our basic notions of space and time” are not sufficient; they do not imply a complete assimilation 
of the “foundational conceptual principle[s]” of relativity (Zellinger 631). The assimilation of 
relativity has been greatly inhibited by the fact that relativity’s conceptual components are 
unintuitive, sometimes to the point of complete unintelligibility, once we step away from the 
theoretical domain of mathematics. Accordingly, the scientific acceptance of relativity (in the 
mathematical sense) sets the stage for an unbearable conceptual friction within our scientific 
worldview, as well as between our scientific worldview and our broader worldview. This is 
partially a result of our prior knowledge; deeply entrenched ontological beliefs, unclear 
epistemological commitments, and a wealth of incompatible background knowledge all play a 
substantial role in making the conceptual implications of relativity particularly unintelligible. In 
light of this, there is a decision to be made. One option is to prioritize the preexisting worldview 
and either ignore, reject, exclude, delay (hold in abeyance), or reinterpret relativity while making 
minor changes to the preexisting worldview. The other option, prioritizing relativity over all 
preexisting beliefs, leads to a deep conceptual disturbance which raises the need for a sweeping 
reclassification of the “physical” and “theoretical” components that make up the world as well as 
daunting philosophical questions regarding the fundamental nature of “truth” and “reality”. To 
choose the former is to eschew the discipline of science and its implications, but to choose the 
latter and unequivocally accept relativity is to acquire knowledge that is profoundly at odds with 
the existing worldview. Remember, the assimilation of relativity into our worldview is not an all-
or-nothing decision, but rather a gradual process that has been advanced and repressed in various 
ways, some obvious and others subtle. Relativity is accepted as the dominant mathematical 
model for the physical sciences, and has incited peripheral conceptual change in our scientific 
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and general worldviews. On the other hand, it is significant that Newton’s influence was not 
confined to any specific domain or discipline, but rather it extensively permeated our entire 
preexisting network of knowledge and beliefs. Thus, although some conflicts between the prior 
worldview and philosophical foundation of relativity can be reconciled, it is immensely difficult 
to identify, isolate, and coherently restructure every piece of knowledge (including the object-
subject dichotomy, absolute simultaneity, the notion of distinct and separable objects, the 
separability of space and time, the belief “that objects…move along a single discrete path”, the 
belief “that time flows at a constant rate regardless of relative motion”, and much more) that is 
influenced by the basic ontological principles of the preexisting Newtonian worldview (Chinn 
and Brewer 17). Our worldview is currently stuck in limbo, caught in a “transitional period” 
between the old Newtonian structure and knowledge acquired via relativity (Keller 718). This 
transition is greatly complicated by the fact that Newtonian concepts are pervasively embedded 
in our everyday language, which makes the philosophical implications of relativity exceedingly 
tough to grasp and express. This ever-present tension between relativity and “some of our most 
cherished everyday notions” provides compelling evidence that, although relativity has been 
tangibly incorporated into our model of science and our understanding of reality, it has not been 
fully assimilated into our general worldview (Hoffman 5). A complete assimilation of relativity 
would require that all preexisting knowledge and beliefs be reconciled with the conceptual 
implications of relativity, but many of those implications are far from being comprehensively 
understood. In order to assimilate relativity into our current worldview, we would thus have to 
initially embrace a radical restructuration of our most fundamental concepts and beliefs, both in 
science and about reality. An unwillingness or inability to restructure our concepts and beliefs is 
an essential part of “why the classical paradigm is so difficult to give up in toto.” (Keller 720) 
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 Alongside prior knowledge and possible alternative theories, Chinn and Brewer cite the 
characteristics of the data itself as an important influence on the response to anomalous data. 
They “propose that there are three characteristics of anomalous data that influence the response 
to such data: the credibility of the data, the ambiguity of the data, and the existence of multiple 
data to rule our prior theory-preserving responses.” (Chinn and Brewer 24) Again, relativity has 
been scientifically accepted and “acquired” because the assessment of these three characteristics 
has been settled conclusively; there is a wealth of data which is credible, specific, incompatible 
with the preexisting Newtonian worldview, and explainable in the framework of relativity. To 
expand our analysis and explore the complete assimilation of relativity, we must consider similar 
questions regarding the integration of the theory of relativity into our broader worldview. It is 
imperative to consider the internal characteristics of relativity: is it credible, is it ambiguous, and 
does relativity (alongside other theories/data) rule out any responses that preserve our prior-
worldview? Analogous to how no “anomalous data can…logically compel a scientist to abandon 
a particular hypothesis because the hypothesis is embedded in a network of beliefs”, no theory 
can logically compel a scientist to abandon a particular worldview (Chinn and Brewer 10). The 
decision to change a scientific theory or worldview is rational, reflective, and calculated rather 
than logically compelled. Accordingly, akin to the need to account for a significant interrelation 
between our prior knowledge and the availability of alternative theories, the characteristics of a 
scientific theory cannot be understood in isolation. These characteristics are defined in part by 
the internal coherency of relativity, but they are also heavily determined through the assessment 
of relativity’s role in, and impact on, our broader network of knowledge. Here, it is once again 
evident that complete assimilation of relativity has been greatly inhibited by its conceptual 
unintelligibility. The unintelligibility of relativity’s theoretical and conceptual implications has, 
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thus far, left us unable to integrate relativity into a coherent and accessible worldview; in turn, 
this creates ambiguity by raising challenging questions about epistemological and ontological 
credibility on one level or another. If the role of relativity in science is credible, unambiguous, 
and incompatible with the prior scientific worldview, should we modify our interpretation of 
relativity or restructure our beliefs in and about science? What if relativity is fully assimilated 
into a scientific worldview that is credible, unambiguous, and incompatible with our broader 
worldview and general understanding of “reality”? Would we then return to questions about the 
scientific role and meaning of the theory of relativity, would we change the way that we interpret 
and implement science, or would we be willing and/or able to appropriately restructure the way 
that we understand and interact with a broader “reality”? These questions are tough to answer 
with any type of confidence or certainty, as they are both philosophically dense and heavily 
interrelated. In order to thoroughly and rationally consider the factors that are imperative to any 
one of these questions, the other questions must already be answered and assimilated into a broad 
network of knowledge. It is precisely this level of comprehension, however, that was precluded 
in the first place. The partial assimilation of relativity has suggested the need for “a cognitive 
paradigm…more radical than the conventional interpretations have offered us”; paradoxically, 
we need a revised network in order to understand the role of the actor, yet that same actor is an 
essential clue regarding the structure and properties of the revised network (Keller 721). We 
need the network in order to contextualize the actor, or a comprehensive understanding of the 
actor in order to illuminate the network, yet the possibility of either one depends on the prior 
fulfillment of the other (Latour 212-236). A more comprehensive understanding of relativity’s 
conceptual implications is a vital prerequisite to the rational assessment of the availability, 
plausibility, quality, credibility, and ambiguity of alternative worldviews which completely 
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assimilate relativity, but this level of conceptual understanding is exceedingly inaccessible (to 
the point of being “unintelligible”) without such a worldview already in place. 
 In addition to prior knowledge, a possible alternative theory, and the anomalous data, 
Chinn and Brewer identify an “individual’s strategies for processing the anomalous data” as “the 
final set of factors that can affect an individual’s response to anomalous data” (Chinn and 
Brewer 29). They define “deep processing” as “mental processes such as attending carefully to 
the contradictory information, attempting to understand the alternative theory, elaborating the 
relationships between the evidence and the competing theories, and considering the fullest 
available range of evidence.” (Chinn and Brewer 29) They note that “theory change is more 
likely when people process contradictory information deeply than when they do not”, but that, 
“in practice, people frequently fail to process contradictory information deeply” (Chinn and 
Brewer 29). Similarly, deep processing of an anomalous theory is far more likely to incite a 
worldview-changing response than processing an anomalous theory superficially. Chinn and 
Brewer cite two ways that people can “be encouraged to process contradictory information 
deeply” (Chinn and Brewer 29). The first is “by fostering personal involvement in the issue”, and 
the second “is to tell reasoners that they will have to justify their reasoning to other people.” 
(Chinn and Brewer 31, 29) These conclusions are heavily supported by a wealth of research in 
psychology. If people “are personally involved with the issue, or if they expect to have to justify 
their reasoning, people process anomalous information deeply and are more likely to change 
their theories [or worldviews] …otherwise, they are content to process the information 
superficially, and theory [or worldview] change is less likely.” (Chinn and Brewer 30) This 
concept of “deep processing strategies” also helps to tie together and explain the other three 
factors - prior knowledge, a possible alternative worldview(s), and the characteristics of the 
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anomalous theory – which are vital to understanding the process of assimilating an anomalous 
scientific theory. Piaget’s theories teach us that knowledge can never be fully assimilated 
“passively, because novelty cannot be handled except through assimilation to a cognitive 
structure the experiencing subject already has…indeed, the subject does not perceive an 
experience as novel until it generates a perturbation relative to some expected result.” 
(Glasersfeld 136) Prior knowledge is necessary to form an expected result, and an expected 
result is necessary to experience a perturbation that “may lead to an accommodation and thus to a 
novel conceptual structure that re-establishes a relative equilibrium.” (Glasersfeld 136) Data and 
theories can only be recognized as anomalous by considering a larger network of preexisting 
knowledge; “nothing by itself [is] either logical or illogical” and “no set of sentences by itself 
[is] either consistent or inconsistent”, and so the process of assimilating knowledge by analyzing 
its characteristics cannot take place in complete isolation (Latour 179). The process of complete 
assimilation requires that the subject simultaneously situate the assimilating knowledge as both 
an actor (the anomalous theory) and as a network (an alternative worldview). Both of these tasks 
involve the complex analysis of, and in-depth integration with, a much broader network of 
preexisting knowledge. Accordingly, deep processing is imperative in order to reveal and 
encourage rational scientific decisions that enable the construction of a coherent worldview. The 
assimilation of knowledge involves a complicated preponderance of evidence rather than a 
straightforward or clear cut decision. Piaget emphasizes the foremost important of perturbations 
for producing cognitive change, yet it seems that perturbations can only be experienced if a 
proper conceptual and physical framework is already in place. In a study of “citizen-science 
projects [which] aim to increase participants’ knowledge about science and the scientific 
process…through the combination of direct participation in a scientific study, interaction with 
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scientists during the project, and use of high-quality educational materials”, Brossard found that 
“no statistically significant change in participants’ understanding of the scientific process, 
attitudes toward science and attitudes toward the environment could be detected.” (Brossard 
1101, 1107) Brossard concludes “that participants, although involved in the scientific process, 
failed to concentrate on this process because they were focused on the subject itself…nothing in 
the experiential context stressed…that they were involved in the scientific process.” (Brossard 
1115) This has profound implications for the assimilation of scientific knowledge. In order to 
experience a perturbation, subjects need both an anomalous experience and an adequate 
framework for analyzing that experience. It is more appropriate to “speak of sciencing rather 
than science…to emphasize science as a human activity rather than a disembodied set of facts 
and principles independent of the knower.” (Tuss 456) Our experiences are mediated by our 
prior knowledge and conceptual framework; accordingly, “citizen-science projects that hope to 
increase understanding of the scientific process should be framed in a way that makes 
participants particularly aware of the scientific process in which they are becoming involved.” 
(Brossard 1117) In this context, it is particularly important that, “in practice, people frequently 
fail to process contradictory information deeply” and that “they attend much more to evidence 
that support their beliefs than evidence that contradicts them.” (Chinn and Brewer 29) In our 
everyday experiences, we are busy focusing on “the subject itself” and “nothing in the 
experiential context” stresses to us that we are “involved in the scientific process.” (Brossard 
1115) Even when we do explicitly concentrate on the underlying scientific processes, our ability 
to recognize and react to perturbations is greatly diminished by our preexisting worldview and its 
high correspondence to our experiential reality; the subtlety, complexity, and philosophical 
density involved in reconciling relativity with the preexisting scientific worldview makes 
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complete assimilation extremely difficult. Without a certain “conversance with a specialized 
vocabulary and facility with mathematical symbols and formulas”, it is challenging to even 
“perceive the advantage of mastering” the conceptual model of relativity (Tuss 451, Glasersfeld 
137). A proper metaconceptual understanding is “a requisite contextual base for assimilating 
information obtained through symbolic, vicarious, and other indirect means.” (Brossard 1102) 
Without such an understanding, knowledge can be acquired but it cannot be fully assimilated. 
Section E- Conclusion 
The paramount importance of deep processing for the possibility of worldview change 
ties together prior knowledge, the possibility of an alternative worldview, and the internal 
characteristics of an anomalous theory in an inextricable feedback loop. These factors are distinct 
and different yet not entirely separable; they blend together in a mix of science and society, actor 
and network, subjective and objective, theoretical and physical, sensory-motor and reflective 
abstraction, utilitarian and epistemic instrumentalism (Latour 212-236). Science revolves around 
“attempts to coordinate theory and data” in order to achieve an understanding which “is a matter 
of fit rather than match”; science thus reveals constructive (as opposed to substantivalist or 
“objective”) truth, which in turn suggests that our worldview “means no less but also no more 
than to have built up a conceptual structure that, in the given context, appears to be compatible” 
with that truth (Chinn and Brewer 13, Glasersfeld 134). Science is a methodology for observing, 
interpreting, and interacting with a larger reality; it aims to minimize the influence of the subject 
(scientist) and standardize the discourse about knowledge, through “objective” measurements 
and categorizations, which in turn enables scientists to systematically construct “a relatively 
reliable and coherent model of…individual experiential worlds” (Glasersfeld 138). In other 
words, our data, theories, and worldviews are all intimately linked. The guiding scientific 
Schwartz	41	
principles of “objectivity” and “rationality” illuminate the paramount important of deep 
processing for the complete assimilation of anomalous knowledge. Any anomalous knowledge 
needs to be processed deeply in order to rationally decide whether it should be accepted or 
rejected, as well as to recognize whether or not it is anomalous. This further emphasizes the 
importance of deep processing, as it is crucial to consider not only the knowledge being 
assimilated but also the preexisting network of knowledge. If the knowledge is not anomalous, 
then it must be situated in and explained by the preexisting network of data, theories, and 
worldview(s); if it is anomalous, then deep processing is necessary to figure out the severity of 
the anomaly as well as to rationally decide on an appropriate response. The assimilation of a 
theory revolves around the dual exploration and understanding of that theory, both in the context 
of the preexisting worldview (the characteristics of the theory “itself”) and in the context of the 
“resulting” worldview (a possible alternative); “itself” and “resulting” are both in quotation 
marks, because they each draw on our prior knowledge as well as the theory which is being 
assimilated (Latour 212-236). Science is a methodical “process of discovery [rather] than a body 
of static knowledge”, and thus knowledge that is assimilated is not and cannot be entirely 
independent from our preexisting network of knowledge and beliefs (Chinn and Brewer 18). 
Science can only advance if knowledge is actively and discerningly assimilated according to 
what is “rational”, as opposed to passively acquired. The superficial processing of knowledge by 
“memorizing facts and training in rote procedures cannot achieve this”; knowledge can be 
acquired using these methods, but “it is naïve to expect that they…also generate understanding.” 
(Glasersfeld 138, 136) It is imperative to deeply process knowledge in order to fully assimilate it 
into a “reliable and coherent model of…individual experiential worlds.” (Glasersfeld 138) 
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Chapter 3: Assimilating Relativity: Moving from Newtonian to Relativistic World Views 
 “It was as if the ground had been pulled out from under one, with no firm foundation to be seen 
anywhere, upon which one could have built”-Albert Einstein (Kumar 1) 
Section A- Acquisition of Relativity 
In 1893, Wilhelm Wien “discovered a simple mathematical relationship that described 
the effect of a change in temperature on the distribution of blackbody radiation.” (Kumar 14) 
Shortly “after Wien published his distribution law, in 1896, [Max] Planck set about trying to 
place the law on rock-solid foundations by deriving it from first principles.” (Kumar 15) Over 
the next few years, Planck and his contemporaries worked tirelessly resolve discrepancies 
between experimental measurements and the predictions of Wien’s law. After finding systematic 
discrepancies at “longer wavelengths, they found the difference between theory and observation 
was so marked that it could be evidence of only one thing, the breakdown of Wien’s law.” 
(Kumar 18) By “manipulating the various mathematical symbols of the equations at his 
disposal”, Planck was able to create an ad-hoc mathematical patch that enabled Wien’s law to 
“almost perfect[ly] match” the data (Kumar 19, my italics). As Planck’s revisions were spread to 
the professional scientific community, “it quickly became clear that Planck was not simply 
proposing ‘an improvement’, some minor tinkering with Wien’s law, but a completely new law 
of his own.” (Kumar 19) Planck knew that it was essential to invest his formula with “true 
physical meaning”, or else it would have “merely the standing of a law disclosed by lucky 
intuition that possessed no more than a formal significance.” (Kumar 20) This process was an 
immense struggle; after what Planck described as 6 weeks of “the most strenuous work of my 
life”, he concluded that “a theoretical interpretation…had to be found at any cost…no matter 
how high…[I] was ready to sacrifice every one of my previous convictions about physical laws.” 
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(Kumar 20-21) Planck slowly came to realize that he could not explain blackbody radiation 
without using the atomic model; he reluctantly “accepted that atoms were more than just a 
convenient fiction, after years of being openly hostile to the atomic theory.” (Kumar 23) This 
acceptance led Planck to realize that energy is transmitted in discrete packets or ‘quanta’, as 
opposed to the continuous model of energy flow that was commonly accepted in physics. 
Ironically, Planck himself failed to grasp the physical significance of this; he “regarded the 
introduction of the quantum, a packet of energy, as a purely formal assumption to which he 
really did not give much thought” (Kumar 27). Planck and his contemporaries considered the 
quantum “nothing more than…a neat mathematical trick on the path to getting the right 
answer…it had no true physical significance.” (Kumar 27) There is a significant difference 
between the acquisition and assimilation of knowledge; as Kumar puts it, “there is a difference 
between making a discovery and fully understanding it, especially in a time of transition.” 
(Kumar 29) After spending the better part of a decade trying “to incorporate the quantum into the 
existing framework of physics”, Planck began to realize “the far-reaching consequences of what 
he had done” (Kumar 29). After years of being a “reluctant revolutionary”, Planck admitted that 
efforts to avoid the quantum theory were useless; exasperated, he declared that “it doesn’t 
help…we have to live with quantum theory…and believe me, it will expand.” (Kumar 29) 
Albert Einstein was one of the first physicists who “learn[ed] to live with the quantum 
[theory].” (Kumar 29) In 1905, he submitted a proposal for a quantum theory of light which “was 
even more radical than Planck’s introduction of the quantum.” (Kumar 32) This was the earliest 
version of Einstein special theory of relativity. Einstein gave credit to Planck for the essential 
role that Planck’s concept of the quantum played in Einstein’s work on relativity; “it was the 
extension of Planck’s quantum concept to light and radiation that he described as very 
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revolutionary, not relativity [itself].” (Kumar 32) Einstein “regarded relativity as a simply a 
‘modification’ of ideas already developed and established by Newton and others, whereas his 
concept of light-quanta was something totally new…and represented the greatest break with the 
physics of the past.” (Kumar 33) Although the wave model of light had been universally 
accepted for nearly a century, “Einstein’s revolutionary point of view [proposed] that light, 
indeed all electromagnetic radiation, was not wavelike at all but chopped up into little bits, light-
quanta”, that act more like tiny particles (Kumar 33). Despite the fact that virtually no one else in 
the professional scientific community believed in the quantization of light for more than another 
decade, Einstein knew that he was onto something significant. Using his model of light quanta, 
Einstein began to accumulate theoretical and quantitative evidence that advanced his framework. 
In 1911, he wrote to his friend Michele Besso “I no longer ask whether these quanta really 
exist… [I will] limit [myself] to trying to understand the consequences of the quantum.” (Kumar 
65) Einstein recognized that knowledge of the quantum had been acquired, but had not yet been 
fully unraveled and assimilated. In this way, “Einstein had been the first to learn to live with the 
quantum, and by doing so [he] revealed a hidden element of the true nature of light.” (Kumar 66)  
Section B- Foundations of the Special Theory of Relativity 
The Special Theory of Relativity was founded on two main postulates. The first is the 
principle of relativity, and the second is the universal speed of light. At first glance, neither one 
seems all that radical. The first postulate, the principle of relativity, “says that the ordinary laws 
of physics apply just as well in a system moving at constant velocity as they do in one at rest” as 
long as that system is “moving at constant speed, in a fixed direction.” (Griffiths 40) In other 
words, “the ordinary laws of physics hold in any inertial system.” (Griffiths 41) We have to 
adjust the numbers and the math to account for the motion of the system, but the key point is that 
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the same laws of physics apply. The second postulate asserts that “light travels at the same speed 
in all inertial frames- regardless of the motion of the source.” (Griffiths 42) Griffiths cites this as 
“Einstein’s truly revolutionary proposal”, noting that “it may sound innocent, but a moment’s 
reflection reveals that it is not just radical, but downright preposterous.” (Griffiths 42) The 
implications of these two postulates are wide-reaching; relativity is challenging to reconcile with 
classical physics because it subtly conflicts with our deeply entrenched Newtonian beliefs about 
ontology and reality in various ways. This makes it extremely difficult to unravel and assess the 
full implications of relativity, which in turn makes it almost impossible to coherently assimilate 
relativity and classical physics into a broader worldview. 
An important thing to note about the Special Theory of Relativity is that it “is not an 
account of any particular physical phenomenon”, but rather “a description of the arena in which 
all phenomena occur.” (Griffiths 39) Griffiths notes that “it takes precedence over all other 
theories” because “it is a theory of space and time themselves”; if you consider any physical law 
or model, the very “first thing to ask would be ‘Is it consistent with special relativity?” (Griffiths 
39) For much of classical physics, the answer to that question is a resounding no. Even in the 
many cases where the empirical data from the classical model matches the empirical data from 
relativity, the implications of relativity suggest a more nuanced way to understand and express 
our empirical findings. Relativity is the be-all and end-all of physics, because physics is based on 
observations and events in a universe which is ultimately governed by relativity. The paramount 
importance and priority of relativity cannot be emphasized highly enough. Our Newtonian model 
of the world, and our preexisting beliefs which are derived from classical physics, must be 
reconciled with insights gained from the special theory of relativity; not the other way around. 
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First and foremost, special relativity invalidates our belief in absolute simultaneity. An 
easy way to understand the logic behind this is to consider the example of a train car which has 
“a lightbulb, hanging from the ceiling at the very center of the car.” (Griffiths 46). If there are 
detectors placed at either end of the car and the car is in constant motion, which detector will the 
light hit first? According to special relativity, we have to invoke the concept of frame of 
reference in order to answer this question. If we consider “the perspective of an observer on the 
train, they both ring at the same time (simultaneously), because the light has just as far to travel 
in both directions.” (Griffiths 46) If we consider “an observer on the ground”, on the other hand, 
“the train itself moves a bit during the process, so the light going to the back end has a shorter 
distance to go”; if light travels at the same speed in both directions, the observer on the ground 
will observe it hitting the back detector first (Griffiths 46). Remember, “relativity has to do with 
what you observe”, once you correct for any errors in judgement and account for all of the data 
(Griffiths 47). We are accustomed to discrepancies in sight, hearing, and other senses, but special 
relativity’s introduction of a “frame of reference” as something that establishes actual substantive 
variation between the observations of different observers is revolutionary. The acknowledgement 
of a tangible interrelation between observer and observed greatly complicates the classical notion 
of “objectivity”. Special relativity posits an insoluble link between space and time, which in turn 
leads scientists to the inescapable conclusion that “two events that are simultaneous in one 
inertial frame are not, in general, simultaneous in another.” (Griffiths 46). This may not seem 
groundbreaking in and of itself, but “Einstein liked to say that all the conceptual difficulties of 
special relativity derive ultimately from the relativity of simultaneity.” (Griffiths 47) When we 
consider the full extent of special relativity’s implications, it should be clear that the relativity of 
simultaneity signified a death blow to “space”, “time”, and “reality” as we knew them. Although 
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it is not particularly challenging to account for relativity in our everyday applications of classical 
physics, it is nearly impossible to accept and internalize the concepts that it is founded on. 
Section C- Partial Assimilation of Relativity 
As far as accounting for the tangible effects of relativity on the mathematical application 
of classical physics, “there are only three or four fundamental surprises- after that everything 
begins to fall into place.” (Griffiths 45) These surprises all incorporate the subject/object and 
observer/observed distinction in one way or another, as these distinctions became deeply 
problematic with the recognition of the relativity of simultaneity. The notion of measurement, 
which depends on the absolute separation of observer and observed, is one concept which is 
particularly impacted. According to the special theory of relativity, the time measurement for a 
specific event, which is obtained in a stationary reference frame, is greater than the time 
measurement that would be obtained in a moving frame of reference. This is commonly referred 
to as “time dilation”, and can be summarized by noting that “moving clocks run slow” (Griffiths 
48). The counterpart to time dilation, called “Lorentz contraction”, states that any spatial 
measurement which is obtained by an observer on the ground will be shorter than if it were made 
by an observer in motion. This sentiment is captured in the phrase “moving objects are short” 
(Griffiths 51). Remember, these are constitutive discrepancies and not just what is experienced; 
it is not that “moving objects appear short, or seem short, or look short; we’re not talking about 
appearances, here – they simply are short, as compared to their rest length.” (Griffiths 51) 
It is not hard to see how these complications arise from the relativity of simultaneity. If 
we consider the notion of spatial measurement, it is clear that it requires us “to read two numbers 
at the same time”; if the object being measured is moving in your frame of reference, then you 
are bound to “make the most elementary blunder in the book” by measuring the front end and 
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waiting to measure the back end (Griffiths 54). There is no absolute answer to resort to, because 
“what’s simultaneous to me is not simultaneous to you” (Griffiths 54). The issue is similar if we 
consider time dilation. For any moving observer, both the moving observer and a stationary 
observer will observe the clock of the other to be running slow. Any attempt to resort to a third 
clock will be foiled by the fact that synchronization is problematic once we consider relativity; 
you may claim that your clock was synchronized with another and is thus more correct than 
mine, but “from my perspective your clocks weren’t synchronized in the first place” (Griffiths 
54). The relativity of simultaneity takes into account the inextricable relationship between space 
and time, and in the process destroys the notion of absolute measurement; in turn, this forces us 
to recognize the monumental role that frames of reference play in our own experiences. It is 
significant that different frames of reference play constitutive roles in creating “reality”. In our 
daily lives, we are tempted to say that something is absolutely moving or absolutely at rest, but 
special relativity reveals this urge to be mistaken. Considering that a subject’s position in and 
movement through spacetime (in other words, their “frame of reference”) influences “reality”, it 
does not make sense to talk about “objective” measurements, events, and occurrences in the way 
that they are traditionally defined by the Newtonian worldview. When a train flies past you at 80 
mph, you can say that the train is moving relative to the tracks, relative to the surrounding trees, 
and relative to you, but those are all just relative reference points. If you consider passing the 
train “in empty space...with no Earth to confuse the issue”, then it is clear that you “each [are] 
moving, relative to the other, and each [are] at rest, in [your] own reference frame.” (Griffiths 
52) Measurements are always relative to something; there are no absolute measurements. 
Recognizing that an underlying degree of relativity exists in our measurements and 
traditional “objectivity” is a revolutionary change in worldview. As we assimilate the subtle 
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implications of moving from Newtonian “space” and “time” to Einsteinian spacetime, it becomes 
increasingly clear that many of our preexisting concepts and beliefs are tainted by the entrenched 
attitude of Newtonian absolutism. In order to create a coherent scientific worldview, we need to 
reconcile the conceptual framework from classical physics with the insight gained from 
relativity. Merging these two networks of knowledge and beliefs has been no easy task; although 
relativity should take scientific priority over classical physics, the truth of the matter is that our 
integration of relativity has been more of a process of give and take. Relativity has altered and 
enriched classical physics, but classical physics has also influenced our understanding and 
assimilation of relativity. This is evident from the example of mass and energy. As “old terms, 
concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships one with the other”, Einstein realized that 
the variables in certain laws needed to be revised (Kuhn 148). Following the realization that 
mass and energy are intimately related in relativistic spacetime, Einstein began to conceptualize 
energy in more nuanced terms that the traditional definition. Einstein broke down conventional 
“energy” into relativistic energy, rest energy, and relativistic kinetic energy, noting that kinetic 
energy could be “converted into rest energy, and hence the mass increased.” (Griffiths 61) 
Although “this is not the same as classical” ways of thinking about mass and energy, “it is close 
when the velocity is much less than the speed of light.” (Griffiths 60) Despite the shift towards a 
fundamentally relational understanding, the concepts of mass and energy are commonly used; 
although we recognize the inextricable relationship between the two, our conceptual framework 
is still stuck in terms of Newtonian mass and energy rather than relativistic mass-energy. This is 
indicative of the general assimilation of relativity; people recognize the flaws in their preexisting 
beliefs in some ways, but project them onto their understanding of relativity in others.  
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Mathematically, scientists are compelled to accept relativity because it allows for a 
greater degree of accuracy. In the process, scientists come to recognize shortcomings in their 
preexisting worldviews via implications that are subtly embedded in relativity. The extent to 
which these are understood, accepted, and repressed varies greatly; the conceptual foundation of 
relativity is neither as intelligible nor as compatible with classical physics as relativity’s basic 
mathematical implications. Furthermore, the chance of feeling any type of perturbation between 
classical physics and relativity is minimal because they match in our regular everyday 
experiences. This makes relativity easy to ignore on a conceptual basis, since the practical and 
mathematical results via classical physics or relativity would be equivalent. Nevertheless, the 
assimilation of relativity reveals subtle and far-reaching implications which potentially have 
something valuable to contribute to our broader worldview. For example, relativistic energy 
illuminated that fact that “nothing with (rest) mass can travel at the speed of light” because “it 
would take an infinite amount of energy” to accelerate it to that speed (Griffiths 62). The only 
thing that could travel at the speed of light would be massless particles; although Newton’s laws 
deny the existence of massless particles (given that “you couldn’t exert a force on it” and “it 
couldn’t exert a force on anything else”), “in relativity it is just conceivable that there could be 
massless particles, provided that they always travel at the speed of light.” (Griffiths 63-64) 
Although classical physics claims that such particles do not exist, these particles have been 
experimentally verified. They are called photons; while they have no mass and travel at the same 
speed (c), quantum mechanics suggests that the difference between a high and low energy 
photon manifests itself as the color of that photon (Griffiths 64). In the process of assimilating 
new scientific information, we open ourselves up to new viewpoints and perspectives; these are 
an essential basis for reassessing our preexisting beliefs and maintaining a coherent worldview. 
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By analyzing and reconciling a multiplicity of perspectives, we become aware of new concepts, 
relationships, and phenomena. Ultimately, this is what enables us to construct a more “reliable 
and coherent model of…[our] individual experiential worlds.” (Glasersfeld 138) Thus, although 
relativity and classical physics match for a large class of basic practical applications, it would be 
a mistake to assume that the conceptual framework of relativity does not have significant value 
and nuance to contribute to our preexisting worldview. There are implications of relativity which 
we have yet to unpack, and there are parts of our scientific worldview which are profoundly at 
odds with relativity and spacetime. Although scientists have introduced new concepts and 
recognized new relationships via the process of assimilating classical physics and relativity, 
problematic artifacts from the preexisting Newtonian worldview remain. Relativity represents a 
radical and revolutionary conceptual framework; in practice, however, the insight that we have 
gained from relativity has only served to produce minor changes in our broader worldview. 
 As we saw with the quantification of Newton’s forces, there is a big difference between 
acquiring an idea and fully internalizing its conceptual foundation. “The key fact [that] Einstein 
discovered” is that “the combined speed of any object’s motion through space and its motion 
through time is always precisely equal to the speed of light”, but “these two kinds of motion are 
always complementary.” (Greene 49) Objects do not move through space at various speeds and 
endure through time, but rather move at a constant rate through spacetime. Accelerated 
movement through space will thus result in a slower passage of time, and vice versa. Although 
“the effects of special relativity are most pronounced when speeds through space are a significant 
fraction of light speed…the unfamiliar, complementary nature of motion through space and time 
always applies.” (Greene 49) Scientists adjusted their variables to account for this relationship 
between space and time, yet continued to think of them as separable entities. We still think in 
Schwartz	52	
terms of the old paradigm, measuring the spatial properties of physical objects as they move and 
interact through time. Special relativity represented a conceptual revolution, in that it showed 
space-time to be indivisible and inextricably linked. This is what Minkowski was alluding to 
when he claimed that “From now onwards space by itself and time by itself will recede 
completely to become mere shadows and only a type of union of the two will still stand 
independently on its own." (Minkowski 37) This, however, did not come to pass; relativity was 
acquired and spacetime was accepted, but they have not yet been fully assimilated. Relativity has 
tangibly revolutionized our scientific model of space and time, yet our understanding of 
spacetime remains woefully incomplete and suffers from critical tensions with the preexisting 
Newtonian worldview. The full conceptual significance of relativity has been cognitively 
repressed, as people continue to think about space-time in terms of 3 dimensions of space + 1 
dimension of time rather than an indissoluble whole. If we consider the full implications of 
understanding spacetime as irreducible and inseparable, then it should be abundantly clear that 
relativity undermines our traditional notion of reality far more than has been acknowledged. 
Chapter 4: Reconciling Relativity and “Reality” 
“We shall see that this ‘truth’ is limited, and we shall consider the extent of its limitation.” 
-Albert Einstein (Einstein 13) 
Section A- Introduction 
A large part of the reason that relativity has been so challenging to assimilate is because 
our understanding of “space” and “time” is more than just an abstract scientific model; it has 
become a crucial component in how we interpret the world around us. “The feeling that time 
flows is deeply ingrained in our experience and thoroughly pervades our thinking and language”, 
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notes Brian Greene, adding that “habitual, colloquial descriptions…refer to a flowing time.” 
(Greene 142) The classical notion of time has set its roots as “something we are within, 
something that is fully integrated into our day-to-day existence, something that is so pervasive, it 
is impossible to excise – even momentarily – from common language (and) our reasoning” 
(Greene 177). Relativity has been accepted and the model of spacetime has been acquired, but 
we need to unpack and internalize the implications of this model in order to fully assimilate 
relativity. As we move from Newtonian “space” and “time” to Einsteinian spacetime, we need to 
reorient our understanding of “objectivity” and “reality” to be compatible with the conceptual 
framework suggested by relativity. As we saw with the example of probabilism, science can 
make significant progress by recognizing underlying levels of subtly and nuance within our 
traditional absolutist concepts; that being said, this is not an easy or comfortable process but 
rather a piecemeal struggle to attain a coherent scientific worldview. Akin to “certainty” and 
probabilism, the cost of learning about “reality” via relativity is that “reality” is revealed to be far 
less straightforward than we had traditionally recognized. Just as Darwin’s theories disturbed 
both scientists and religious thinkers, the assimilation of relativity is sure to involve challenging 
and wide-reaching revisions to our traditional ways of thinking. Relativity offers an opportunity 
to construct a better scientific worldview, but not without effort and conflict along the way. To 
better understand reality, we may first have to concede that there is no “reality” (Latour 178). 
In my final chapter, I will consider the implications of moving from Newtonian “space” 
and “time” to Einsteinian spacetime. One of the most significant consequences of this shift is that 
“truth” and “reality” cannot coherently be defined as ontological preexistence; instead, we need 
to recognize a greater degree of nuance and think about the ways in which reality is (inter)-
actively created as opposed to passively discovered. In a universe ultimately ruled by general 
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relativity, in which “the stage warps as matter tells space how to curve, and space tells matter 
how to move”, it is apparent that we can no longer think about reality in quite the traditional 
sense (Rosenblum and Kuttner 258). This is evident in Brian Greene’s discussion of space, time, 
objectivity, consciousness, and free will. Next, I will examine Karen Barad’s theory of agential 
realism, which represents her attempt to assimilate the fundamental tenets of an anomalous 
scientific theory with the largely incompatible framework of classical physics. Barad’s work 
serves two purposes; first, it is an excellent case study, as it is indicative of general trends in the 
process of assimilating anomalous scientific information. Secondly, agential realism is an 
interesting heuristic framework because it accounts for and coherently expresses the unintuitive 
interrelation between spacetime and matter that will be discussed in Section B. Barad attempts to 
rescue as many of our Newtonian beliefs as possible, while steering clear of the epistemological 
weaknesses and mistakes that continue to plague classical physics. Agential realism is highly 
speculative and does not represent the solution to assimilating relativity, but it helps to provide a 
heuristic understanding of how our traditional notions of “truth” and “reality” can be enriched by 
recognizing underlying degrees of nuance which have been glossed over all along. This makes it 
easier to accept and embrace relativity on a fundamental level, as well as to recognize the ways 
in which relativism is already present in our everyday lives and experiences. I will conclude by 
considering the legacy of Newton’s framework, in light of relativity and quantum mechanics, as 
well as what all of this demonstrates about the assimilation of anomalous scientific information. 
Section B- Moving from Newtonian “Space” and “Time” to Einsteinian Spacetime 
As Brian Greene notes, “not everything in relativity is relative.” (Greene 58) Despite the 
fact that “absolute space does not exist” and “absolute time does not exist”, he posits that special 
relativity implies that “absolute space-time does exist.” (Greene 59) Greene suggests that “just as 
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we envision all of space as really being out there, as really existing, we should also envision all 
of time as really being out there, as really existing, too.” (Greene 139) Greene analogizes 
spacetime with a loaf of bread, and takes special relativity to mean that we each cut our “now” 
slices at slightly different angles (Greene 135). This notion is problematic in and of itself. If “we 
are all within spacetime” and “every experience you or I ever have occurs at some location in 
space at some moment of time”, then how can we possibly reconcile our notions of passing time 
and free will with an absolute spacetime whole? If spacetime is absolute and deterministic, then 
it seems that “the flowing river of time more closely resembles a giant block of ice with every 
moment forever frozen into place.” (Greene 141) Our entire lives are frozen within a small 
section of that block, and accordingly everything that we have ever done, thought, and said must 
be set in stone. The only way to rescue our notion of free will and passing time would be to 
admit that spacetime is not “absolute”, at least in the traditional sense of being both complete 
and consistent. If “every moment is” and “can change no more than a particular location can 
move in space”, then we need to recognize and account for some level of indeterminacy if we are 
to preserve any type of freedom regarding the way that we interact with the world (Greene 141). 
General relativity plays a crucial role in this apparent paradox. As Einstein himself 
pointed out, “as for the question of the absoluteness of space-time in general relativity, it no 
longer has the character of something which acts without being acted upon” (Rynasiewicz). 
While ours may be “an egalitarian universe in which every moment is as real as any other”, “the 
essential structure of spacetime – the separation into future, past, and elsewhere – is absolute, in 
special relativity.” (Greene 132, Griffiths 67) If our notion of free will is correct, then sentient 
life forms have a very odd relationship with spacetime. Spacetime is a sort of container of all 
conscious beings’ thoughts and actions, but at the same time conscious life exerts an influence on 
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spacetime itself. An absolute spacetime, at least according to the traditional definition of 
“absolute”, does not leave room for this type of dualistic interrelation. Although spacetime is 
absolute in the sense that it contains “past, present, and future equally”, “the notion of now” 
nevertheless “plays a central role in our worldview” and influences our actions, which in turn 
shape the “absolute” spacetime loaf (Greene 138). In terms of a Minkowski diagram, “at each 
moment your forward light cone represents the future…the only region you could possibly 
influence…[and] the backward light cone is your past – the region of spacetime that can possible 
influence you.” (Griffiths 66) Time may not flow in absolute spacetime, but it does seem to flow 
for the conscious beings that inhabit spacetime; this is an essential discrepancy. 
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If we are correct in thinking that time influences our conscious decisions (which it seems 
that it does, if only the past can influence “right now” and if “right now” can only influence the 
future), then the “passage” of time exerts a weird influence on spacetime which is difficult to 
analyze. We have traditionally used “reality” as “our shorthand term for the existence of 
physically real properties” which are independent from observation, but relativity vastly 
complicates the notions of “physically real” and “independence” by inextricably linking space 
and time (Rosenblum and Kuttner 187). Are past and/or future objects capable of being 
“physically real”? Is being “real” a matter of traditional ontological preexistence, or is “reality” 
more appropriately modeled as something which is actively created and developed? Does it 
make sense to posit a strict dichotomy between observer and observed, subjective and objective, 
material and theoretical? Can any object be completely independent from any other object, if 
they are both a part of the 4-dimensional spacetime whole? Without the fundamental 
presupposition of absolute simultaneity, derived from the core belief in absolute space and 
absolute time, other concepts which have been subtlety influenced by Newtonian thought begin 
to lose their coherency. What is the significance of this analysis? It reveals a trend of making the 
same mistakes time and time again, mistakes which all relate to the way that we think about 
spacetime. We consider objects and measurements absolute, when we should be focusing on the 
relationship between them. We always find ourselves searching for an “absolute reality” and an 
answer for the way that things “really” are, yet we rarely stop to consider that such an answer 
may not exist; that constantly evolving spatiotemporal relationships might be all that there is to 
“reality”. We ignore the fact that scale matters, and assume that “reality” must be something 
which can be added up and broken down without altering its essnetial properties. Relativity 
revealed that spacetime is an inextricable entity, yet we continue to think in terms of space as 
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separable from time. The concept of a frame of reference suggests that we need to reconsider the 
way that we think about reality, and recognize that we are a part of it rather than idle observers.  
Section C- Agential Realism 
There are significant implications to the recognition that we are active participants in a 
reality which is influenced and created, rather than “discovered”. The bidirectional interrelation 
of spacetime and matter is one particularly difficult implication, as it stands in stark contrast to 
the absolutism of space and time in the traditional Newtonian model. Although Barad provides a 
useful and plausible heuristic model for the unintuitive interrelation of spacetime and matter, this 
is not her explicit intent. Rather, Barad’s theory of agential realism is focused on crafting Bohr’s 
Copenhagen Interpretation into a plausible worldview without altering its fundamental tenets. 
Barad characterizes her assimilation of the quantum theory as a “relational ontology" 
which is free from the “ontological and epistemological presuppositions that are challenged by 
the quantum theory.” (Barad 352) Barad uses the similarities between Einstein and Bohr’s 
worldviews as a jumping-off point, noting that they “share a belief in humanism” despite the 
“important differences between them” and their theories (Barad 352). Although “Einstein wants 
the human observer removed from the system of interest while Bohr insists on the constitutive 
role of the human observer in measurement observations, both presume that the notion of the 
human is a well-defined concept that refers to an individually determinate entity with inherent 
properties, like the ability to engage in cognitive functions that make the universe intelligible.” 
(Barad 352) Barad cites this as a central “presupposition [which] has been an obstacle to 
resolving some of the long-standing problems in quantum theory, such as the Schrodinger cat 
paradox, the EPR paradox, and the measurement problem.” (Barad 352) This presupposition is 
problematic, especially in the wake of relativity, because it gives human consciousness an 
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extremely privileged frame of reference. Why should we be so special as to collapse 
wavefunctions and force the probabilism of the micro-world into a macroscopic “reality”? 
Barad’s “account understands the human not as a supplemental system around which the theory 
revolves but as a natural phenomenon that needs to be accounted for within the terms of this 
relational ontology”, noting that our world “requires us to take account of the fact that we are 
part of that nature which we seek to understand.” (Barad 352) “Rather than giving humans 
privileged status in the [quantum] theory, agential realism calls on the theory to account for the 
intra-active emergence of humans as a specifically differentiated phenomena…quantum theory 
has something to say about the ontology of the world, of that which we are a part- not as 
spectator, not as pure cause, not as mere effect.” (Barad 352) 
Agential realism fits very well with everyday experience and common intuition, despite 
the fact that it uses vocabulary which is strange and foreign. This is a small price to pay; after 
almost four centuries of interpreting the world in terms of Newtonian concepts, we lack some 
terms for describing our experiences outside of that framework. Barad knows that she is using 
unfamiliar jargon, so she elaborates on her fundamental concepts by using concrete examples 
from science and nature. To illustrate the falsity of the strict traditional dichotomy between 
subject and object, Barad invokes the analogy of a blind man with a cane: “the man can hold the 
cane tightly so that it functions as an instrument of observation (an extension of the person trying 
to negotiate the room)” or, “on the other hand, he can hold it loosely so that it becomes an object 
of observation.” (Barad 358) “The cane is neither inherently part of the object nor the agencies of 
observation”; the man can observe the cane or use it as a tool to observe his surroundings, but he 
cannot do both at the same time (Barad 358). In general, this suggests that “the line between 
subject and object is not fixed and it does not preexist particular practices of their engagement, 
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but neither is it arbitrary…rather, object and subject emerge through and as part of the specific 
nature of the material practices that are enacted.” (Barad 359) This echoes the sentiment of Bohr, 
for whom “the relation between knower and known is much more intimate” and the “inherent 
fixed Cartesian distinction between subject and object is an unfounded prejudice of the classical 
worldview” (Barad 359). To Bohr and Barad, the “inseparability of…relation as it is materially 
enacted constitutes the very possibility for understanding…phenomena objectively…intra-acting, 
not merely intervening, is entailed in both experimental and theoretical practices.” (Barad 359) 
 This requires a profound rethinking of spacetime, science, and reality about which Bohr 
and Einstein “were always slightly at cross-purposes” (Kuhn 148). For Barad, “what is made 
manifest through technoscientific practices is an expression of the objective existence of 
particular material phenomena.” (Barad 361) Barad believes that reality does exist; “this is, after 
all, a realist conception of scientific practices”, but it is not reality in the traditional Newtonian 
sense (Barad 361). “Unlike in traditional conceptions of realism”, Barad’s agential realism 
claims that “objectivity is not preexistence (in the ontological sense) or the preexistent made 
manifest to the cognitive mind (in the epistemological sense) …objectivity is a matter of 
accountability for what materializes, for what comes to be…it matters which cuts are enacted: 
different cuts enact different materialized becomings.” (Barad 361) We play a role in what 
comes to be and what cuts are made, since we are both participants and observers at all times. 
 This brings us full circle to a revised understanding of objectivity, spacetime, and reality. 
Barad notes that “objectivity can’t be a matter of seeing from somewhere, as opposed to the view 
from nowhere (objectivism) or everywhere (relativism), if being situated in the world means 
occupying particular coordinates in space and tine, in culture and history.” (Barad 376) We 
should “resist the familiar conception of spacetime as a preexisting Euclidean container that 
Schwartz	61	
presents separately constituted bodies with a place to be or a space through which to travel…the 
spacetime manifold does not sit still while bodies are made and remade”, because “the 
relationship between space, time, and matter is much more intimate” (Barad 376). In this sense, 
agential realism clearly and distinctly embodies a fundamental understanding of space as type (a) 
rather than type (b). “Space and time (like matter) are phenomenal…they are intra-actively 
produced in the making of phenomena; neither space nor time exist as determinate givens outside 
of phenomena…as a result of the iterative nature of intra-active practices that constitute 
phenomena, the ‘past’ and the ‘future’ are iteratively reconfigured and enfolded through one 
another: phenomena cannot be located in space and time; rather, phenomena are material 
entanglements that ‘extend’ across different spaces and times.” (Barad 383) This means that “the 
production of the new can’t be located and it certainly can’t be owned” and “neither the past nor 
the future is ever [completely] closed.” (Barad 383) The past does not change, but there is “intra-
active generation of new temporalities, new possibilities, where the ‘new’ is the trace of what is 
yet to come.” (Barad 383) This gives us a better sense of the complex relationship between 
conscious beings and spacetime referenced in Brian Greene’s discussion of spacetime. A 
relativistic reality consists of “an ever-changing multidimensional topological manifold of 
spacetimematter”, as opposed to a “three-dimensional object located in space with the barest hint 
of time thrown in for good measure, that not only comes across as spatialized but is literally 
represented spatially.” (Barad 388) “Spacetime itself is…reconfigured through an ongoing intra-
active engagement, and bodies are among the differential performances of the world’s dynamic 
intra-activity, in an endless reconfiguring of boundaries and properties, including those of 
spacetime …techno-scientific…practices entail space-time-matter-in-the-making.” (Barad 376) 
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 In turn, this forces us to reconsider our traditional notion that knowledge and truth are 
founded upon external, absolute, physical events. William James questioned this understanding 
in the 1800’s, noting that “throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object have 
been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities…and thereupon the presence of the latter to the 
former, or the ‘apprehension’ by the former of the latter, has assumed a paradoxical character 
which all sorts of theories had to be invented to overcome.” (James 102) Barad echoes this 
sentiment, arguing that “knowledge making is not a mediated activity…knowing is a direct 
material engagement, a practice of intra-acting with the world as part of the world in its dynamic 
material configuring, its ongoing articulation.” (Barad 379) Barad notes that “knowing and being 
are material practices”, but thinks of them as “entangled…knowing is a distributed practice that 
includes the larger material arrangement... [it is] a specific engagement of the world where part 
of the world becomes differentially intelligible to another part of the world in its differential 
accountability to and for that of which it is a part.” (Barad 379) While Barad’s explanation seems 
to contain an inherent duality, this is by design rather than an error. Our entire lives embody this 
relativism; conscious beings influence spacetime and spacetime influences us. The relationship is 
indissolubly intertwined, as the way that we perceive spacetime and its parts influences how we 
choose to interact with it/them. In a nutshell, “it matters to the world how the world comes to 
matter” and sentient life forms (such as humans) “are living testimony to the inseparability of 
knowing, being, and doing.” (Barad 380) Reality does not consist merely of “a web of causal 
relations that we are implicated in”, for “we are a much more intimate part of the universe than 
any such statement implies.” (Barad 394) Rather than thinking of the future as “the end point of a 
set of branching chain reactions”, Barad thinks of it as “a cascade experiment” in which “not 
even a moment exists on its own.” (Barad 394, 396) For Barad, notions “such as ‘this’ and ‘that’, 
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‘here’ and ‘now’, don’t preexist what happens but come alive with each meeting” because “the 
world and its possibilities for becoming are remade with each moment.” (Barad 396) Barad, akin 
to Greene, demonstrates that a fundamentally relativistic model of spacetime goes hand in hand 
with achieving a more nuanced and relational understanding of objectivity, truth, and reality. 
Section D- Newton’s Legacy and Concluding Remarks 
 In light of recent scientific developments, such as relativity and quantum mechanics, 
what remains of Newton’s framework and legacy? Newton’s worldview was not perfect by any 
means. First, it was heavily influenced by the religious views of Newton and his contemporaries. 
Additionally, it was inhibited by the general public’s lack of scientific education and distorted by 
the preexisting obsession with traditional, absolute “certainty”. Many of the foundational 
assumptions underlying “the Newtonian mechanistic worldview, and what we today call classical 
physics, [are] challenged by modern physics.” (Rosenblum and Kuttner 31) At the time (and for 
centuries thereafter), Newton’s worldview represented a major breakthrough for science and our 
understanding of spacetime, in the sense that it linked space and time through motion, forces, and 
other similar concepts. Yet, in consideration of Einstein’s work on relativity, Newton’s work was 
a vast understatement of the extent to which “space” and “time” are truly interconnected. 
Although Newton’s worldview has often been revised and improved, many “aspects of 
Newton’s legacy will forever endure.” (Rosenblum and Kuttner 31) Newton’s work played an 
essential role in establishing “science” as its own distinct discipline, separate from that of natural 
philosophy. There were religious undertones in Newton’s work, but he was also revolutionary 
for the extent to which he did manage to divorce the spiritual from the physical. Newton’s model 
may not have been perfect, but it served as an invaluable stepping stone for enabling physicists 
to make sense of the physical world. Newton’s recognition that space and time are intricately 
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related was a conceptual breakthrough of monumental importance. It is true that Newton failed 
to recognize and assimilate the extent to which spacetime was inextricable, but Einstein’s 
realizations would likely never have been possible without the groundwork that Newton laid. 
Einstein’s work on relativity represented the first major challenge to the framework that 
Newton had posed centuries earlier. Relativity was revolutionary because it jeopardized the view 
of space and time that science had taken for granted since the discipline began; although aspects 
of Newton’s work had been refined and retouched, relativity challenged Newtonian physics on a 
more fundamental level. The full implications of relativity redefined space and time, and in turn 
threatened many of the basic tenets of classical physics, from the notion of physical objects to 
the concept of an absolute reality. These implications, however, are understood and assimilated 
to varying degrees. From a glossed-over summary of relativity, one could mistakenly conclude 
that relativity means nothing more than synthesizing our traditional understandings of “space” 
and “time” into a quasi-traditional spacetime. The significance of relativity as a conceptual 
revolution is not apparent until it is deeply processed and actively assimilated. 
When relativity was first tested and empirically confirmed, people did not know what to 
make of it. Outside of the upper echelon of the professional scientific community, relativity was 
promoted and understood in basic, overly reductionist terms. The general public celebrated 
Einstein’s accomplishments, but continued to perceive their lives in more familiar Newtonian 
terms. Many academics could tell you that relativity implied that space and time are actually 
spacetime, but very few could really explain the significance of that statement. Scientists 
recognized and accepted Einstein’s insights, but were primarily concerned with mastering them 
on an empirical and practical basis rather than unraveling and understanding what they implied 
for our conceptual model of the world. Relativity was tangibly and significantly acquired, but it 
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has yet to be completely assimilated. Although relativity radically undermined the traditional 
understanding of space and time, and thus shifted the paradigm for mathematical science, 
Newton’s worldview continues to dominate the way that we interpret and explain our daily 
experiences. Relativity implies that we need to make some major conceptual adjustments in 
regards to the way that we understand both spacetime and reality, but these adjustments have not 
been fully made in most contexts. We still think in terms of separable physical objects, change 
over time, and absolute external reality, despite the fact that these notions are derived from the 
outdated Newtonian model of absolute space and time. We have continued to interpret our lives 
through a heavily Newtonian framework, but being explicit about that can help us to appreciate 
and understand the challenges that relativity poses to the classical worldview. 
Questions about spacetime, science, and the role of science in a broader “reality” are 
essential to the assimilation of relativity. These mysteries hint at the intricate entanglement of 
epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics which lies at the very foundation of scientific inquiry. 
The tensions between classical mechanics and relativity are profoundly subtle and challenging to 
interpret, but it is clear that our understanding of concepts such as truth, free will, reality, change, 
measurement, space, and time are at the heart of this debate. Relativity suggests that many of our 
traditional dichotomies, such as that between observer/observed and objective/subjective, are 
fundamentally flawed. Relativity highlights the need to embody a radically different conceptual 
framework and hints at necessary components of that framework, but does not make the entirety 
of the relativistic worldview readily accessible to us. An examination of the ways that “space” 
and “time” have been misunderstood throughout spacetime is a crucial step towards clarifying 
the shortcomings of our preexisting beliefs and assimilating the conceptual revisions that a more 
fundamentally relativistic worldview demands. In the words of Albert Einstein, “we cannot solve 
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our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.” (BrainyQuote) A deeper, 
more nuanced understanding of Einsteinian spacetime, and its implications, could provide the 
foundation that we need in order to assimilate the theories of relativity, reinterpret the world 
around us, and reconcile fundamental inconsistencies in how we conceptualize “reality”. 
Analogous to probabilism and “certainty”, relativity has helped to reveal underlying 
complexities in our traditional understanding of “objectivity”. In turn, this has challenged many 
of the conventional Newtonian dichotomies and suggested the need to revise our worldview on a 
fundamental level. This is indicative of the assimilation of anomalous information in general; as 
we assimilate anomalous scientific data and theories, we are forced to think more deeply about 
our preexisting network of knowledge and beliefs. Reconciling anomalous scientific information 
with a preexisting framework is a complicated task, which involves a number of thorny and 
interrelated questions. It is never as simple as considering a single theory or piece of data in 
isolation, for our data, theories, and worldviews are all intimately linked. These complicated and 
subtle relationships, which are not readily apparent at first glance, can only be revealed gradually 
through an active process of assimilation. Thus, although assimilation is obviously essential for 
dealing with anomalous information and figuring out how to situate it in our broader worldview, 
it is also fundamental for constructing and maintaining a coherent worldview in the first place. 
Science cannot be placed on a pedestal and “observed”, free from the relativism of observers and 
subjectivity and societal influences. This speaks to the essential role of assimilation in creating 
and maintaining scientific progress; for it is only through the active processing of anomalous 
information that scientists can gradually unpack its subtle implications, and thereby work to 
attain the intelligibility necessary to uphold the scientific standards of rationality and objectivity. 
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As we attempt to build a “reliable and coherent model of individual experiential worlds”, the 
deep processing of perturbations, via assimilation, is an invaluable approach (Glasersfeld 138). 
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